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ABSTRACT

The Persian Gulf War of 1991 highlighted the gulf
between the executive and legislative branches over the
extent of the president's constitutional and practical war
powers.

President Bush appealed to his constitutional

designation as commander-in-chief, among other things, as
well as U.N. authorization in asserting broad authority to
conduct extensive military activity in the Persian Gulf.
Congress, on the other hand, countered by invoking their
plenary constitutional war powers and the requirements of
the War Powers Resolution.

This thesis examines that

controversial and recurring debate.
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CHAPTER 1
THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
I.

INTRODUCTION

The debate over the appropriate allocation of war
powers between the president and Congress has raged since
the Constitution was drafted.

The president, as commander-

in-chief, possesses broad discretion in exercizing his
authority over military affairs and foreign policy.

His

power is balanced, however, by the constitutional
requirement that Congress declare war, raise armies, and
appropriate funds.

In a modern context, these shared and

divided war powers have led to a complex and continuing
debate over how the Founders intended war powers to be
defined and, notwithstanding their intentions, whether
presidential practice and congressional acquiesence have
changed the Constitution's meaning.
The discussion over war powers has been complicated by
passage of the War Powers Resolution, an attempt by Congress
to reassert authority over military deployments, and by
America's membership in the United Nations, whose requests
for American involvement in multilateral military operations
have increased dramatically in the last decade.
1

The Persian

Gulf War encompassed all these factors and provides a
classic example of the struggle between the president and
Congrebs over how America should go to war.

Considering the

escalating number of global conflicts involving American
troops, it is a question that transcends the Gulf War and
certainly one that warrants further examination.
II.

OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

The events surrounding the initiation of the Persian
Gulf War illustrate the disagreement between the executive
branch and the legislative branch over the extent and scope
of the president's unilateral military authority.
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait.
The next day President George Bush met with key advisors
from the National Security Council, his cabinet, and the
military to formulate a U.S. response.

General Norman

Schwarzkopf, leader of Central Command, presented a
previously designed plan (Operations Plan 90-1002) for
defending Saudi Arabia that involved the deployment of
150,000 troops.1 National Security Advisor Brent
Scowcroft, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, and Joint Chiefs
Chair Colin Powell favored a military response.2

1
Time Magazine, Otto Friedrich, ed. , Desert Storm:
The War in the Persian Gulf (Boston:
Little, Brown & Co.,
1991), p. 24.
2
U.S. News and World Report, Triumph Without Victory
(New York: Times Books, 1992), p. 65.
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President Bush immediately ordered three aircraft
carriers to the region and NATO was informed of a possible
troop deployment.

Although the President publicly assured

the nation that the U.S. was not contemplating military
action, he did indicate at a press conference on August 3
that the U.S. would not allow Iraq to retain Kuwait:

"I

view very seriously our determination to reverse out this
agression. . . . This will not stand.

This will not stand.

This agresssion against Kuwait."3 Saudi Arabia initially
declined the President's offer of troops but after several
days of negotiations and a visit to Saudi Arabia by
Secretary Cheney to emphasize the Iraqi threat, King Fahd
decided to permit the deployment.
Meanwhile, President Bush and Secretary of State James
Baker began extensive diplomatic discussions with numerous
countries to establish a coalition willing to impose
economic and diplomatic sanctions against Iraq.4 Once
President Bush decided to send soldiers, these countries
were similarly solicited to commit troops to a multinational
U.N. force led by the United States.

The Bush

administration promised to forgive billions of dollars in

3
James P. Pfiffner, "Presidential Policy-making and
the Gulf War, " in The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War.
Marcia Lynn Whicker, James P. Pfiffner and Raymond A. Moore
eds. (Westport, CN: Praeger Series in Presidential Studies,
1993), p. 4.
4
Dilip Hiro, Desert Shield to Desert Storm (New York:
Routledge, 1992), p. 112.

4

debt to critical countries such as Syria, Egypt and Turkey,
in exchange for their support of the U.S. military
deployment.
President Bush ordered the deployment of troops to
Saudi Arabia on August 6th.

He publicly announced on August

8th that the U.S. would send a possible 50,000 troops to
Saudi Arabia, and officially notified Congress of the
deployment the next day.

According to presidential

spokesperson Marlin Fitzwater, the President's letter to
congressional leaders informing them of the deployment was
"consistent with the War Powers Resolution" but was not the
formal notification required by the legislation.5

In a

speech announcing the military action, President Bush
explained that the troops' mission was "wholly defensive"
and that they would "not initiate hostilities."6

President

Bush also stated that the time restrictions of the War
Powers Resolution should not be commenced as American troops
would not be faced with immediate hostilities.

Within two

weeks, nearly 100,000 American troops were deployed in the

5
Jean Edward Smith, George Bush's War (New York:
Henry Holt & Co., 1992), p. 106. President Bush's statement
was consistent with previous presidents who, while not
explicitly repudiating the WPR and facing a confrontation with
Congress, sought to avoid its reporting requirements by filing
reports that merely paid lip service to the resolution.
6
Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf
War Reader (New York: Times Books, 1991), p. 199.

5

Gulf.7 Originally, Congress strongly supported the
President's decision to defend Saudi Arabia.

For example,

House Speaker Tom Foley was quoted as saying, "Democrats and
Republicans, House and Senate . . . are very strongly of the
opinion that the president had to act."8
Despite the extensive discussions about military action
taking place within the Bush Administration and with its
international allies, the only legislator informed of
President Bush's decision to send troops prior to their
deployment was Senator Sam Nunn, Chairperson of the Senate
Armed Services Committee.9 Although Congress immediately
constituted a committee of eighteen members for the
President to consult if he contemplated hostilities,
President Bush ignored it.

On August 22, President Bush

first acknowledged the possibility of offensive action when
he responded to reporters' queries about a potential use of
force:

"I don't rule in or rule out the use of force."10

As the magnitude of the deployment became apparent,
several legislators expressed misgivings about the
President's unilateral military commitments.

Senator Joseph

7
Robert J. Spitzer, "The Conflict Between Congress
and the President Over War, " in The Presidency and the Persian
Gulf War, p. 28.
8

Smith, p. 102.

9
James A. Nathan, "Revising the War Powers Act,"
Armed Forces and Society 17 (Summer 1991), p. 513.
Smith, p. 138.

6

Biden was quoted as saying he was "struck at the size of
this.

This is a big, big deal. . . I never contemplated

talk of 250,000 troops."

He added that there should be "not

only some consultation, but some extensive debate."11

On

September 17, Representative Henry Gonzalez expressed a
similar sentiment in a letter to House Speaker Foley:

"Do

we have a president? Or a Caesar? A monarch? A potentate . .
. What happened to the power invested in Congress to declare
war?1,12
President Bush's assertion that U.S. troops were not
deployed into a hostile situation seemed contradicted by the
facts.

Satellite photos indicated that a large number of

Iraqi troops were massed on the border of Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia.

As the first American troops arrived in the region,

Iraq deployed 50,000 more troops to the Saudi border.13

By

late September, the Pentagon estimated that Iraq had 430,000
troops and 2,800 tanks in Kuwait.

U.S. troop strength was

estimated at slightly more than 150, 000.14 Although
President Bush and his advisors were not certain that Iraq
would attack Saudi Arabia and embroil American troops in

11
12

The Gulf War Reader, p. 360.
Hiro, p. 190.

13
Arthur H. Blair, At War in the Gulf (College
Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1992), p. 17.
14

Ibid., p p . 29 , 31.

7

war, the President acknowledged the seriousness of the Iraqi
threat in a speech on August 8, 1990:
But we must recognize that Iraq may notstop using
force to advance its ambitions.
Iraq has amassed an
enormous war machine on the Saudi border capable of
initiating hostilities with little or no additional
preparations. Given the Iraqi government's history of
aggression against its own citizens as well as its
neighbors, to assume Iraq will not attack again would
be unwise and unrealistic.15
The public, and hence not suprisingly, the majority of
Congress continued to support the President's policy in the
Persian Gulf throughout the fall.

On October 1, 1990, both

houses of Congress overwhelmingly passed resolutions that
supported the troop deployment.16 Leaders of both Houses
made clear, however, that their approval of the
actions did not authorize the use of force.

President's
As the troop

buildup continued, a few members of Congress began to
increasingly question the President's actions.

Although no

vote was taken, Senator Mark Hatfield introduced legislation
requiring the President to invoke the War Powers Resolution
(WPR) or ask for specific congressional approval.17
Secretary Cheney, among others in the administration, did
not want Congress to meddle in the President's foreign
policy and was quoted as he candidly acknowledged: "As a

15

The Gulf War Reader, p. 198.

16
The House voted 380 in favor and 2 9 against the
resolution.
The Senate passed the resolution by an even
larger margin: 96-3.
Smith, p. 172.

8

former member, I have to say it was an advantage that
Congress was out of town" when troops were initially
committed.18
Congress adjourned in October with the provision that
it could be recalled on two days notice if required.

By the

middle of October, President Bush asked advisors whether
Hussein could be ejected from Kuwait with the existing
number of ground forces.19 The military was then requested
to prepare a preliminary attack plan.20 On October 31,
President Bush secretly approved the timetable for a January
air battle and a February land offensive.21

Later,

President Bush was to tell U.S. News and World Report:
I became convinced early on that, if diplomacy failed,
we would indeed have to use force. . . I kept hoping
that the use of force could be avoided.
I cannot
pinpoint all of this to a certain date, but I was
determined from the very beginning that aggression
would not stand . . ,22
Throughout October, President Bush repeatedly discussed
offensive options with military leaders, coalition members,
and the administration.

However, during several meetings

with congressional leaders he failed to inform them of any

18

Ibid., p. 172.

19

Triumph Without Victory, p. 155, 166.

20

Smith, p. 188.

21

Hiro, p. 229.

22

Triumph Without Victory, p. 172.
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possible offensive action.23

Congressman William

Broomfield put it succinctly:
While the president has taken great pains to consult
with the Soviets, the Syrians, the Egyptians, the
Saudis, the French, the Germans, the British, and many
others at the United Nations . . . his administration
has failed adequately to consult with the American
Congress.24
Although President Bush clearly understood the practical
political necessity of garnering international support for
his actions in the Persian Gulf, he ignored the equally
important political necessity of marshalling domestic
support by coordinating his military response with the U.S.
Congress.
III.

OPERATION DESERT STORM

On November 8, shortly after congressional mid-term
elections and while Congress was in recess, President Bush
announced that the number of troops in the Gulf would be
doubled to 430, 000.25 He explained in a news conference:

23 Smith, p. 198. It should be noted that author Dilip
Hiro stated President Bush initiated talks with Congress on
October 5 regarding the possible use of force.
(Hiro, p.
225) .
The vast majority of Persian Gulf War authors, however,
maintain that the President did not discuss his plans with
Congress nor did he ever indicate that congressional
authorization was required.
24

Smith, p. 204.

25
At least one author describes a build-up of that
magnitude as the point of no return on the road to war.
(Pfiffner, p. 7).

10

After consultation with King Fahd and our other allies,
I have today directed the secretary of defense to
increase the size of U.S. forces committed to Desert
Shield to insure that the coalition has an adequate
offensive military option should that be necessary to
achieve our common goals.26
Shortly after the announcement, Secretary Cheney stated
the position of the executive branch to the Senate Armed
Services Committee as follows:

"I do not believe the

President requires any additional authorization before
committing U.S. forces to achieve our objectives in the
Gulf."27 During an exchange with reporters in late
October, President Bush had similarly insisted he possessed
the power to initiate unilateral military activity without
authorization from Congress:

"History is replete with

examples where the president has to take action.

And I've

done this in the past (Panama) and certainly . . . would
have no hesitancy at all."28

Congressional Democrats were

angered by the timing of the announcement and believed that
it was related more to domestic political considerations
than to military considerations.29
26
Quoted in The Gulf War Reader, pp. 228-29.
When
questioned about the troop increase the next day, President
Bush added, "I have not ruled out the use of force at all . .
. and I think that is evident by what we're doing here today."
(Triumph Without Victory, p. 176).
27
Quoted by Harold Honju Koh, "Presidential War and
Congressional Consent:
The Law Professors Memorandum in
Dellums v. Bush." Stanford Journal of International Law 27
(Spring 1991), p. 248.
28

Smith, p. 4 n. 17.

29

Triumph Without Victory, p. 177.
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In the Gulf War Reader. Washington Monthly editor James
Bennet reviewed numerous newspaper accounts and concluded
there were earlier clues that should have indicated the
administration was preparing an offensive.

For example, as

early as September 16, The New York Times reported:
The question here has shifted from how well the United
States and its allies would defend the Saudi kingdom to
how well Washington and its allies might exercise an
"offensive option" to push the Iraqis out of Kuwait.30
Author Dilip Hiro similarly argued that the decision to
implement an offensive response was taken much earlier than
November.

He asserted that the September 17th dismissal of

General Michael Dugan for revealing offensive military
details to reporters signaled the end of the defensive phase
of Desert Shield and the commencement of the offensive
phase.31
Ironically enough, although the Bush Administration
thought congressional authorization was unnecessary, they
strongly believed international approval was crucial before
offensive force was used.32 During the months following
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the United Nations passed
twelve resolutions condemning the invasion, imposing
economic sanctions, demanding the release of hostages, and

The Gulf War Reader, p. 360.
Hiro, p. 189.
Triumph Without Victory, p. 173.

demanding an Iraqi withdrawal.33 The most critical of
these, U.N. Security Council Resolution 678, was passed on
November 29th after extensive U.S. diplomatic efforts.

It

stated that member states might use "all necessary means" to
enforce previous resolutions if Iraq did not leave Kuwait by
January 15, 1991.

After the vote on the resolution, Under

Secretary of State Bob Kimmitt stated, "We feel like we now
have a strong basis in international law for the use of
force."34

President Bush subsequently asserted that he had

the constitutional authority to use force to implement the
U.N. resolution without further congressional
authorization.35
As it became apparent that President Bush believed he
could initiate offensive military action in Kuwait without
reference to Congress, an increasing number of legislators
33
James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay, From Shield to
Storm (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1992), p. 34-35.
34

Triumph Without Victory, p. 182.

35
Mathew D. Berger, "Implementing a United Nations
Security Council Resolution:
The Presidential Power to Use
Force Without the Authorization of Congress," Hastings
International and Comparative Law Review 15 (Fall 1991), p.
84 .
In Triumph Without Victory, the authors argue that
innumerable post-war interviews reveal:
The decision to seek United Nations involvment was
part of a larger, more cynical strategy of the Bush
administration to circumvent Congress, to bypass
the constitutional authority of Congress--and only
Congress-- to declare war.
(Triumph Without
Victory, p. viii).
Later, a confidant of Secretary Baker was quoted as saying,
"How could the United States not support something that
Ethiopia was supporting?"
(Ibid., p. 198).
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became vocally opposed to the President's position.

On

November 10, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell stated
that the President "must come to Congress and ask for a
declaration.

If he does not get it, then there is no legal

authority for the United States to go to war."36
Representative Ronald Dellums and 53 other members of
Congress filed a federal lawsuit seeking to enjoin the
President from attacking Iraqi troops without express
congressional approval. Although Judge Harold Greene ruled
that the issue was not ripe for a decision as the majority
of Congress had not sought the injunction, he did state the
following:
An injunction may issue at the request of Members of
Congress to prevent the conduct of a war which is about
to be carried on without congressional authorization .
37

This ruling was significant because it indicated that the
judge in Dellums. unlike the majority of other courts which
had dismissed war powers issues summarily, might have
granted an injunction to the majority of Congress if the
President had not sought congressional authorization for the
war.
On November 13, several members of Congress demanded
that President Bush call a special session of Congress to
discuss the Persian Gulf conflict.
36
37
1990) .

President Bush

Quoted by Spitzer, p. 29.
Dellums

v. Bush. 752 F.Supp. 1141, 1149

(D.D.C.

14

circumvented the issue by replying that he had not decided
to use force and the troop increase only made that option
more credible and possible.38 Senator Nunn began hearings
on November 27 in front of the Armed Services Committee
regarding whether the U.S. was becoming involved in war too
rapidly.

Most witnesses, including two former chairs of the

Joint Chiefs, testified that sanctions were working and
should be continued.39 Many in Congress also still
believed that economic and diplomatic pressure could force
Iraq from Kuwait without the necessity of a military
response and concommitant loss of life.
On November 30, President Bush told congressional
leaders he would like a congressional review of his Persian
Gulf policy but if Iraq failed to withdraw from Kuwait by
the January deadline he would not need to consult with
Congress prior to commencing the war.40 At a Camp David
meeting on December 1, the President similarly asserted
that, although he was concerned with the reaction of
Congress, he had the legal authority as commander-in-chief
to commence military activity without congressional
approval.41

38

Blair, p. 38.

39

Desert Storm, p. 31.

40

Triumph Without

Victory, p. 185.

41

Triumph Without

Victory, p. 187.
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In a letter to President Bush on December 27, 1990,
Congressman George Miller and 110 other Democratic
representatives emphasized that the U.N. could not authorize
a U.S. offensive:
So long as neither the lives of American citizens nor
our troops are subjected to immediate danger and the
international economic embargo continues to exert
substantial pressure against Iraq . . . offensive
military action by the United States unwisely risks
massive loss of life . . . (the U.N.) does not commit,
or authorize, the use of United States armed forces.42
Despite congressional misgivings about President Bush's
unilateral military commitment, the majority of Congress
still either tacitly or vocally supported the troop
deployment.

This is perhaps not surprising in light of

public opinion polls which indicated that President Bush's
actions maintained broad public support.43

In fact, Senate

leaders planned to recess until January 23rd (after the U.N.
deadline) and consequently avoid directly addressing the
Persian Gulf issue.

The strenuous objections of senators

such as Tom Harkin and Brock Adams caused Senate Majority
Leader George Mitchell to reconsider.44 After reviewing
42
Quoted in "Yes, no, maybe," Economist 18 (January
5-11, 1991), p. 19.
It should be pointed out that the U.N.
has no power to implement its decisions.
Member states may
either comply or refuse to comply with the requests made in
its resolutions.
43 By December, opinion polls indicated that nearly 65%
of Americans approved using force to achieve the nation's
goals. (Blair, p. 60) . A poll conducted by the Washington
Post and ABC News similarly showed that 7 of 10 respondents
favored the use of force.
(Triumph Without Victory, p. 202).
The Gulf War Reader. 260.
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several constitutional considerations, Senator Harkin
argued:
So any objective reading of the Constitution itself and
the clear language of the Constitution, or any reading
of the Federalist Papers, or writings of those who
drafted this clear clause in the Constitution, can lead
to only one clear and unambiguous conclusion: that
only Congress can declare war, and the president has
the power to repel attacks and invasions, which is not
the situation at hand.45
After continuously maintaining that legislative
authorization was not needed, President Bush formally
requested congressional support on January 8th.

This

request followed intensive lobbying by the administration
which indicated the majority of Congress would support a
declaration of war.

Democratic leaders asked the President

to forestall offensive action until a vote was taken;
however, he declined to give any assurances.46

In fact,

the next day the President commented, "I don't (think I need
it . . .

I feel I have the authority to fully implement the

United Nations resolutions."47
A sharply divided Congress passed a joint resolution
after several days of vigorous debate, authorizing the
President to "use United States armed forces pursuant to

45

Ibid., p. 262.

46

Ibid., p. 192.

47
Louis Fisher, "Historical Survey of the War Powers
and the Use of Force, " in The Constitution and the Power to Go
to War. Gary M. Stern and Morton H. Halperin, eds. (Westport,
CN : Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 25.
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United Nations Security Council Resolution 678. 1,48 The
resolution expressly maintained that the authorization was
to be consistent with the War Powers Resolution of 1973.49
The House also overwhelmingly passed a general resolution
stating:
The Congress finds that the Constitution of the United
States vests all power to declare war in the Congress
of the United States. Any offensive action taken
against Iraq must be explicitly approved by the
Congress of the United States before such action may be
initiated.50
During debate on the resolution, Senator Nunn commended
the President for "recognizing Congress' constitutional
role."

Representative Richard Durbin similarly concluded

that "the United States' Constitution has prevailed."S1

48

The Senate voted 52-47 in favor of the resolution.
The House voted 250-183 in favor of the resolution.

49 Congressional acquiescence to the President's policy
may have been influenced by the fact that Bush did not request
the vote until only several days remained before the January
15th deadline. As one commentator notes, several legislators
did not support the war:
However, the president had got himself, and the country's
prestige so committed to the deadline set by the United
Nations (at our behest) that by the time the debate
began, on Thursday, January 10, there was no question as
to the outcome of the vote.
(The Gulf War Reader, p.
189) .
. . . George Bush, by working multilaterally through the
United
Nations
(and
unilaterally
making
troop
commitments), had rendered Congress irrelevant.
(ibid.,
p. 192).
50

Cong. Rec. H405 (January 12, 1991), p. 302.

51
Michael J. Glennon,
"The Gulf War and the
Constitution," Foreign Affairs 70 (Spring 1991), p. 84.

18

President Bush, on the other hand, stated the following upon
signing the resolution:
My request for congressional support did not, and my
signing of this resolution does not, constitute any
change in the long-standing position of the executive
branch on either the President's constitutional
authority to use the Armed Forces to defend vital U.S.
interests or the constitutionality of the War Powers
Resolution.52
Interestingly enough, President Bush indicated that he
might have commenced Operation Desert Storm even if Congress
had voted against using force.

Prior to the vote, the

President repeated remarks made to coalition diplomats at
Christmastime:
it boils down to a very moral case of good versus evil,
black versus white. If I have to go (to war), its not
going to matter to me if there isn't one Congressman
who supports this, or what happens to public opinion.
If it's right, it's gotta be done.53
In his memoirs, former Vice President Dan Quayle concluded
that President Bush would still have initiated the Persian
Gulf War without legislative authorization.54 When asked
after the vote if he could have proceeded if Congress voted
against the resolution, the President replied:

"I still

feel that I have the constitutional authority, many
attorneys have so advised me."55

52

Quoted by

Koh, p. 254, n. 26.

53

Quoted by Smith, p. 237.

54 Dan Quayle, Standing Firm (New York:
Publishers, 1994), p. 227.
55

Quoted by

Pfiffner, p. 22 n. 32.

HarperCollins
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Considering President Bush's comments and his
unilateral escalation of the situation in the Persian Gulf
prior to asking for congressional authorization, if the vote
was a victory for the Constitution, the Constitution
prevailed by the narrowest of margins.

CHAPTER 2
CONSTITUTIONAL GRANTS OF POWER

The Framers were acutely aware of the perils of
concentrating the power over war.

After much discussion,

consequently, they decided to shackle the "dog of war" by
providing that war powers would be both divided between and
shared by the legislative and executive branches through
several express constitutional provisions.

This separation

of powers, however, has generated enormous conflict over its
proper exercise.

In fact, within five years of the

Constitution's ratification, prominent Framers James Madison
and Alexander Hamilton were already arguing over whether the
Constitution granted President George Washington the
authority to issue a neutrality proclamation in the war
between Britain and France.56 The discussion regarding the
constitutionality of President Bush's actions in the Persian
Gulf War is only a continuation of this historic debate.

56
Ralph A. Rossum and G. Alan Tarr, American
Constitutional Law. 3rd ed. (New York:
St. Martin's Press,
1991), p. 157.
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I.

CONGRESSIONAL WAR POWERS

A.

THE DECLARATION CLAUSE

Congress derives its war powers from several
constitutional provisions.

The most prominent grants

Congress the authority to "declare war."57

Prior to

drafting the Constitution in its final form, the Framers
proposed various methods of going to war.

Charles Pinckney

and Alexander Hamilton suggested that the Senate be given
the authority to make war.

Edmund Randolph responded that

the power would best be placed with the House of
Representatives.

Only Pierce Butler recommended that the

warmaking power be given to the executive; however, his
suggestion received no recorded support.58
In fact, after specifically discussing the potential
problems of an excutive possessing power over war, the
Framers deliberately chose to give this power to
Congress.59

Thus, they initially agreed to give Congress

the power to "make" war.

James Madison and Elbridge Gerry

later suggested this should be changed to "declare" war in

57

Article 1, section 8.

58
James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal
Convention of 178 7 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1966),
p. 476.
59
David Gray Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential
Warmaking: The Enduring Debate," Political Science Quarterly
103 (Spring 1988), pp. 3-4.
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order to give the president authority to "repel sudden
attacks. "60
Scholars differ on what the Framers intended "declare"
to mean.

Shortly after the Constitution was drafted,

Alexander Hamilton explained the declaration clause and its
significance as follows:
The Congress shall have the power to declare war; the
plain meaning of which is, that it is the peculiar and
exclusive duty of Congress, when the nation is at
peace, to change that state into a state of war;
whether from calculations of policy, or from
provocations or injuries received; in other words, it
belongs to Congress only to go to war.61
Law professors Ann Thomas and A.J. Thomas define a
declaration of war as "simply a communication made by one
nation state to another that the status of peace.

. . is now

terminated and a status of war has taken its place."62

In

a commonly used definition of the Framer's time, Emerich de
Vattel described war as "that state in which we prosecute
our rights by force."63

In Bas v. Tinav (1800), the

Supreme Court referred to war as a "contention by force
between two nations, in external matters, under the
authority of their respective governments."64
60

Legal

Madison, p. 476.

61
Quoted by Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A.J. Thomas, Jr.,
The War-Making Powers of the President (Dallas:
SMU Press,
1982), p. 37.
62

Ibid., p. 36.

63

Ibid., p. 39.

64

4 Dallas 37, 40 (U.S. 1800)

scholars such as David Gray Adler, Edwin Firmage, Francis
Wormuth, and John Hart Ely maintain the term "declare" was
well understood at the time of the Framers to be synonymous
with commence.65

Firmage and Wormuth argue that

contemporary usage shows the declaration clause "gave to
Congress the exclusive right to initiate war."66 This
interpretation coincides with James Madison's statement
regarding the importance of separating war powers:

"Those

who are to conduct a war . . . cannot in the nature of
things, be the proper or safe judges whether a war ought to
be commenced, continued or concluded. 1,67
Several constitutional experts such as Eugene Rostow
and Terry Emerson argue that the change from "make" to
"declare" lessened Congress' power.

Rostow believes the

term "declare" war refers only to the distinction between a
state of war and peace at international law and using force
during times of peace is part of the "sovereign right of
self defense."68

Rostow quotes Professor Ratner who

65
Adler, p. 6; Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin B.
Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War (Dallas: Southern Methodist
University Press, 1986), p. 20; John Hart Ely, "Suppose
Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked," Columbia Law
Review 88 (November 1988), p. 1379 n. 33.
66

Wormuth and Firmage, p. 21.

67
Quoted by Michael J. Glennon, Constitutional
Diplomacy (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press,
1990), p. 83 (emphasis supplied).
68
Eugene V. Rostow, "Great Cases Make Bad Law: The
War Powers Act," in Modern Constitutional Theory: A Reader.
2nd ed. eds. John H. Garvey and T. Alexander Aleinikoff (St.
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contends that the change from "make" to "declare" actually
grants the president much more authority than simply to
"repel sudden attacks."

In a modern context, it "authorizes

the president to protect Americans from external force in an
emergency."

This, concludes Ratner, indicates that

"presidentially authorized hostilities are always ostensibly
'defensive.'"69

Gordon Crovitz adds that the distinction

between "declare" and "make" is of great significance as it
allows for a broad range of presidential military activity
without congressional authorization.70
The majority of constitutional scholars, on the other
hand, maintain that substituting the word "declare" for
"make" merely authorizes the president to defend the country
against attack or "to have the direction of war when
authorized or begun."71

The complete power to commence war

remained vested in the legislature.
expert Edward Corwin explains:

As noted constitutional

"It was clearly the original

understanding of the Constitution that under it all measures
of hostility toward another government not justifiable
immediately as acts of self-defense, have the sanction of

Paul:

West Publishing Co., 1991), p. 216.
69

Ibid., p. 216.

70
Gordon L. Crovitz, "Micromanaging Foreign Policy,"
The Public Interest 100 (Summer 1990), p. 108.
71
Quoted by Charles A.
Reflection and Choice (New York:
1986), p. 13.

Lofgren, Government from
Oxford University Press,
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Congress."72

Law professors Edwin Firmage and Francis

Wormuth concur and explain that the motion's meaning was
clear.

It left the power to initiate war with Congress

subject to "the reservation that the President need not
await authorization from Congress to repel a sudden attack
against the United States."73

Constitutional scholar John

Hart Ely similarly argues that the substitution of "declare"
for "make" was made:
to make clear that once hostilities were
congressionally authorized, the President, as Commander
in Chief, would assume tactical control. . . and to
preserve to the President the power, without advance
congressional authorization, to respond defensively to
"repel sudden attacks."74
After reviewing the comments of the Framers, presidential
scholar Arthur Schlesinger Jr. concludes that "no one wanted
either to deny the President the power to respond to
surprise attack or to give the President general power to
initiate hostilities."75
The argument that the change in this constitutional
provision did not divest Congress of any significant war
72
Quoted by Jeremy J. Stone, "Presidential First Use
is Unlawful," Foreign Affairs 56 (Fall 1984), p. 105.
73
Wormuth and Firmage, p. 18. Louis Fisher adds that
the power to repel sudden attacks is an emergency measure
which does not authorize the President to "take the country
into full-scale war or to mount an offensive attack against
another nation." (Louis Fisher, "The Power of Commander in
Chief" in The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War, p. 48).
74

Ely, pp. 1387-88.

75
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973), p. 4.
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power is supported by numerous statements by influential and
diverse members of the Constitutional Convention.

Their

comments indicate that the Framers considered congressional
authority to declare war of vital importance to the
preservation of democracy.

James Madison stated:

Every just view that can be taken of this subject
admonishes the public of the necessity of a rigid
adherence to the simple, the received and the
fundamental doctrine of the Constitution, that the
power to declare war is fully and exclusively vested in
the legislature; that the executive has no right, in
any case, to decide the question, whether there is or
is not cause for declaring war; that the right of
convening and informing Congress, whenever such a
question seems to call for a decision, is all the right
which the Constitution has deemed requisite and
proper.76
James Wilson concurred:
This system will not hurry us into war, it is
calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the
power of a single man, or a single body of men, to
involve us in such distress, for the important power of
declaring war is vested in the legislature at large and
this declaration must be made with the concurrence of
the House of Representatives; from this circumstance we
may draw a certain conclusion that nothing but our
national interest can draw us into a war.77
Because of their fear of the tyranny of a monarchy, it
is clear that the Framers wanted Congress alone to decide

76
Quoted by
Constitution," p. 87.
77

Glennon,

"The

Gulf

War

Quoted by The Gulf War Reader, p. 261.

and

the
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when war would be initiated.78 As Madison wrote to Thomas
Jefferson:
The Constitution supposes what the history of all
governments demonstrates, that the executive is the
branch of power most interested in war, and most prone
to it. It has accordingly, with studied care, vested
the question of war in the legislature.79
Experience with the English king caused the Framers to fear
that the president might abuse a war power.

George Mason

expressed this fear when he stated he was "against giving
the power of war to the Executive, because [he was] not to
be trusted with it."80 Gerry added that he "never expected
to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive
alone to declare war."81
The Framers' statements indicate they believed
Congress' power to declare war to be of great significance
and not simply a seldomly-used formality.

The Framers

agreed that congressional participation would minimize the
dangers of precipitous military involvements and maximize
the requirements for deliberation and debate.

78
According to Charles Lofgren, state ratification
debates shed little additional light on this issue as the
states were unconcerned with how the government would go to
war (Lofgren, p. 16) . Only one of 77 proposed amendments
dealt with Congress' power to go to war and this would have
required a 2/3 vote of both houses to declare war (Ibid.).
79
Quoted by
Constitution," p. 87.

Glennon,

"The

Gulf

War

and

the

80

Fisher, "The Power of Commander in Chief," p. 48.

81

Ibid.

Although the right of Congress to formally declare war
is rarely contested,

the question of what type of military

activity constitutes war is the source of much debate.

As

the Constitution only uses the word "war, 11 it is unclear
from the declaration clause alone whether the Framers
intended it as a generic term to apply to all forms of
hostilities short of formal war or whether it left the
commander-in-chief with the authority to initiate and
participate in limited uses of force.82
Rostow, and other supporters of executive power, argue
that under international law declarations of war are only
required on the limited occasions when states "engage in
unlimited general war."83 Terry Emerson adds that the
Framers were aware declarations of war had already fallen
into disuse and thus knew that Congress' declaration power
would be limited to a small number of cases.84
Representative Dick Cheney similarly maintains:

"The

declaration of war is almost an outmoded concept under
virtually any set of circumstances we can conceive of under

82
W. Michael Reisman, "War Powers:
The Operational
Code of Competence," in Foreign Affairs and the U.S.
Constitution. eds. Louis Henkin, Michael J. Glennon, and
William D. Rogers (New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc.,
1990), p. 69.
83
Eugene V. Rostow, "President, Prime Minister or
Constitutional Monarch, " American Journal of International
Law 83 (October 1989), p. 744.
84 Terry J. Emerson, "Making War Without a Declaration,"
Journal of Legislation 17 (Winter 1990), pp. 29-30.
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which a president would decide to commit troops to
combat.1,85
However, to restrict Congress' power over war to the
extremely small number of cases in which a formal
declaration is issued appears inconsistent with the weight
the Framers gave this power and with their expressed
intention to curtail the president's ability to embroil the
nation in hostilities.

It seems reasonable to conclude the

Framers intended that the declaration provision encompass
the power to initiate both total war and limited or
undeclared war.

Otherwise, Congress could not effectively

check presidential military power and determine whether
armed intervention would be in the national interest.

As

international legal scholar John Basset Moore explains:
There can hardly be room for doubt that the framers of
the constitution, when they vested in Congress the
power to declare war, never imagined that they were
leaving it to the executive to use the military and
naval forces of the United States all over the world
for the purpose of actually coercing other nations,
occupying their territory, and killing their soldiers
and citizens, all according to his own notion or the
fitness of things as long as he refrained from calling
his action war or persisted in calling it peace.86

85
Quoted in War Powers and the Constitution
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1984), p. 3.
During the Vietnam War, Under Secretary of State Nicholas
Katzenbach similarly argued that Congress' authority to
declare war was "outmoded phraseology."
(quoted by John T.
Rourke and Russell Farnen,
"War,
Presidents and the
Constitution," Presidential Studies Quarterly 18 (Summer
1988), p. 515).
Quoted by Wormuth and Firmage, p. 33.
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Early federal cases indicate that the courts also
believed Congress' authority over the initiation of military
conflict was complete.

In 1782, the Federal Court of

Appeals explained that international law recognized two
types of war over which Congress had power:
The writers upon the law of nations, speaking of
different kinds of war, distinguish them into perfect
and imperfect: A perfect war is that which destroys
the national peace and tranquility, and lays the
foundation for every possible act of hostility. The
imperfect war is that which does not entirely destroy
the public tranquility, but interrupts it only in some
particulars, as in the case of reprisals.87
The U.S. Supreme Court similarly recognized in Talbot v.
Seeman (1801), 88 that Congress could authorize total war or
partial war.89

Chief Justice John Marshall added:

"The

whole powers of war being, by the Constitution of the United
States, vested in Congress, the acts of that body alone be

87

Quoted by Adler, p. 7.

88

1 Cranch 1 (U.S. 1801) .

89
See also Bas v. Tingy. 4 Dallas 37 (1800), in which
the Supreme Court
explained that "Congressis empowered to
declare a general war, or Congress may wage a limited war . .
II

In The Eliza. 11 S .Ct. 113 (1800), the Supreme Court
reiterated the differences between formal declared wars and
imperfect wars:
If it be in declared form, it is called solemn, and
is of the perfect kind; because one whole nation is
at war with another whole nation . . . But
hostilities may subsist between two nations, more
confined in its nature and extent; being limited as
places, persons, and things; and this is more
properly termed imperfect war; . . .(quoted in
Lehman, p . 57) .
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resorted to as our guides in the inquiry."90

In United

States v. Smith (1806), Justice Patterson reiterated
Congress' power:
of making war?

"Does he [the President] possess the power
That power is exclusively vested in Congress

.1191
After reviewing the historical evidence, legal scholar
Charles Lofgren concludes that the Framers intended
Congress' power to "commence war to be as broad as the
Confederate Congress" -- which was exclusive.

He continues:

Since the old Congress held blanket power to
"determine" on war, and since undeclared war was hardly
unknown in fact and theory in the late eighteen
century, it therefore seems a reasonable conclusion
that the new Congress' power to declare war was not
understood in a narrow technical sense but rather as
meaning the power to commence war, whether declared or
not.92
Political scientist Morton Halperin similarly argues that
the declaration clause clearly signifies:

"The president

may not introduce the United States into a military
situation without the consent of Congress.

90

1

This applies

Cranch 1, 24 (U.S. 1801) .

91 27 F.Cas. 1192, 1230 (No. 16342) (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806),
quoted by David Gray Adler, "Foreign Policy and the Separation
of Powers:
The Influence of the Judiciary," in Judging the
Constitution. eds. Michael W. McCann and Gerald L. Houseman
(Glenview, IL:Scott, Foresman and Co., 1989), p.
157.
92
Lofgren, pp. 35-36.
Douglas Steele
adds that
evidence from the state ratification conventions "strongly
suggests that the ratifiers believed the power to declare war
in the Constitution to be virtually identical to the power of
determining war contained in the Articles of Confederation."
(Douglas L. Steele, "Covert Action and the War Powers
Resolution," Syracuse Law Review 39 (1988), p. 1150).
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whether the war is declared or undeclared, whether it is
gradual or immediate,
B.

. . . .93

LETTERS OF MARQUE AND REPRISAL

In addition to the power to declare war, Congress
derives authority over military action from its
constitutional power to "grant letters of marque and
reprisal."94

From its origins in the Middle Ages, the

practice of reprisals evolved into using public armies in
limited ways.95 Although this term has fallen into disuse
today, numerous scholars argue

that at the

time of the

Framers the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal
signified authority over hostilities short of war.96
According to Halperin: "Congress' constitutional power to
'grant letters of marque and reprisal' is the historical and
legal equivalent of today's low-intensity conflict."97
Special letters were granted by Congress "for the peacetime
satisfaction of private claims."98

Peter Raven-Hansen

93 Morton H. Halperin, "Lawful Wars," Foreign Policy 72
(Fall 1988), pp. 187-88.
94
95

Article I, section 8, clause 11.
Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking,"

p. 8.
96
Steele, p. 1152; Mark J. Yost, "Self Defense or
Presidential Pretext?
The Constitutionality of Unilateral
Preemptive Military Action," Georgetown Law Journal 78
(December 1989), p. 423; Schlesinger, p. 21.
97

Halperin, p. 188.

98

Lofgren, p. 31.
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adds:

"Any power to commence undeclared war that was not

granted to Congress by the Declaration Clause was therfore
arguably granted by the Marque and Reprisal Clause."99
The use of the term reprisal is consistent with the
concept of limited wars.

Hugo Grotius, a writer with whom

the Framers were familiar, asserted that declared wars were
perfect and undeclared wars were imperfect.
imperfect wars with reprisals.100

He equated such

Grotius' contemporary

Jean Jacques Burlamaqui elaborated:

"This last species of

war [undeclared or imperfect war] is generally called
reprisals.

. ."101 Lofgren argues that even if the Framers

did not intend the declaration clause to be interpreted
broadly, the addition of the authority to grant letters of
marque and reprisal "conferred on Congress control over
general reprisals outside the context of declared war. 1,102
Francis Wormuth and Edwin Firmage similarly maintain that
whatever powers were not covered directly under the
declaration clause were "residual" in Congress' power to
issue letters of marque and reprisal.103

Justice Joseph

Story in his Commentaries on the Constitution concluded that

99 Peter Raven-Hansen, in The U.S. Constitution and the
Power to Go to War, p. 31.
100

Lofgren, p. 27.

101

Ibid.

102

Ibid., p. 32.

103

Wormuth and Firmage, p. 179 n. 4.
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Congress was given the power over letters of marque and
reprisal to remove doubts about legislative power to
authorize undeclared hostilities.104
C.

THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE

Another constitutional provision that grants Congress
warmaking authority is the general responsibility conferred
upon the legislative branch "to make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer Thereof."105
Legal scholar Alexander Bickel maintains that this power
encompasses the president and thus:

"The implied powers of

the federal government, most of the unstated powers that
inhere in nationhood, most everything that went without
saying or that is residual--all that belongs to
Congress."106

This enumeration grants Congress power to

take measures short of war.107

Political scientist Jeremy

Stone adds that the "necessary and proper" power coupled
with Congress' war powers grant Congress the authority to

104

Quoted by Lofgren, p. 12.

105

Article 1, section 8.

106 Alexander M. Bickel, "Congress, thePresident and
the Power to Wage War," in Modern Constitutional Theory:
A
Reader, p . 209.
107

Ibid., p. 212.
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conduct war in many respects.108 Terry Emerson warns,
however, that this power "cannot be used as a guise for
congressional measures stripping the Executive of its vested
functions."109 Although Congress cannot use its authority
under the necessary and proper clause to infringe on the
president's express power, it can legislate on military
affairs that are outside the president's authority.
It should additionally be remembered that Congress' war
powers in Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution also
consist of its authority to "raise and support Armies," "to
provide and maintain a Navy," "to provide for calling forth
the militia," and "to provide for the common defense."110
The Constitution grants only Congress the power to
initiate war, both declared and undeclared.

Determining

what constitutes war within the meaning of the Constitution
should be a question of substance not semantics.

Experience

has shown that if the president has the exclusive right to
decide what type of military action constitutes war, he
merely avoids using the title and thus justifies any type of
unilateral military involvement.
108

Stone, p. 99.

109

Emerson, p. 31.

For example, when

110
Legal Scholar William Van Alstyne argues that
Congress' paramount war power is derived from its authority to
determine whether the United States should even have an army
or navy.
(Charles Bennet et al., "The President's Powers as
Commander-in-Chief
Versus
Congress'
War
Power
and
Appropriations Power," University of Miami Law Review 43
(September 1988), pp. 26-28.
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President Harry Truman sent troops to South Korea to stop
the North Korean offensive in 1950, he referred to the
situation as a "police action" rather than a war.

This

semantical sleight-of-hand was followed by President Lyndon
Johnson in Vietnam, President Ronald Reagan in Grenada, and
President Bush in Panama and the Persian Gulf.

Practical

factors such as the number of troops deployed and the length
and danger of the engagement should be obvious
considerations.

For example, deploying 12 00 marines to

facilitate the PLO evacuation does not clearly invoke the
specter of war.

On the other hand, sending 25,000 troops to

Panama to capture President Manuel Noriega leads one to the
opposite conclusion.

More specifically, deploying over

400,000 troops to the Persian Gulf who are threatened with
imminent attack by the Iraqi army even more obviously
presents a war-like situation that requires congressional
approval.
Clearly President Bush should have, and did eventually,
receive congressional authorization prior to commencing
offensive action against Iraq.

However, a more

controversial question concerns whether the President should
have received congressional approval at an earlier date.
When troops were initially deployed, Saudi Arabia
immediately needed American military assistance to fend off
an anticipated Iraqi offensive.

There was little time for

congressional debate and the President arguably acted
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appropriately.

Furthermore, he indicated that American

troops were engaged in a strictly defensive operation which
Congress sanctioned by resolution in October.

However, the

President should have requested congressional authorization
prior to doubling the number of troops and publicly
endorsing an offensive option.
since the invasion.

Several months had elapsed

Congress had time to debate and

determine the appropriateness of offensive action before
additional troops were committed and Congress was presented
with a fait accompli.

It is ironic that the Bush

Administration went to such great lengths to marshall
international consensus on war while ignoring its
responsibility to seek the even more critical approval of
the U.S. Congress.
The deployment of over 400,000 troops, coupled with the
President's threats of force, escalated the situation into a
de facto war.

The Constitution requires that Congress alone

determine whether the U.S. should be engaged in such largescale military operations.
II.

PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS
A.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

The president derives his war power from several
clauses in the Constitution.

The most prominent states that

the president is the "Commander in Chief of the Army and
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Navy of the United States."111 As a practical matter, this
power confers upon the president virtual autonomy over a
broad range of military activities during times of peace and
control over hostilities once war is declared.

Since the

time of President Truman, presidents have invoked their
authority as commander-in-chief to justify unilateral
military activity without the prior approval of Congress.
President Bush, for example, maintained that he could deploy
troops to Saudi Arabia pursuant to his power as commanderin-chief .
Although the executive branch interprets the commanderin-chief clause broadly,112 legal scholars differ on
whether the clause grants the president authority over all
military conflicts short of total war or whether it merely
designates the president as commander of U.S. forces once
Congress has chosen to become involved militarily.

111

Justice

Article II, section 2, cl. 1.

112
In an argument very similar to the ones made by the
executive department prior to the Persian Gulf War, the State
Department under
President
Johnson issued a bulletin
supporting the President's actions in the Vietnam War by
referring to his power as commander-in-chief:
Under the Constitution, the President, in addition to
being Chief Executive, is Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy.
He holds the prime responsibility for the
conduct of the United States foreign relations.
These
duties carry very broad powers, including the power to
deploy American forces abroad and commit them to military
operations when the President deems such action necessary
to maintain the security and defense of the United
States. (quoted in David O'Brien, Constitutional Law and
Politics. vol 1 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1991), p.
220 . )
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Robert Jackson insightfully remarked that the commander-in
chief clause implies:
something more than an empty title. But just what
authority goes with the name has plagued presidential
advisors who would not waive or narrow it by non
assertion yet cannot say where it begins or ends.113
Proponents of presidential power such as Eugene Rostow,
Gordon Crovitz, Geoffrey Miller, and Terry Emerson argue
that the commander-in-chief clause empowers the president to
take unilateral military activity in a wide range of
circumstances.114

The majority of constitutional

scholars, on the other hand, maintain that the commander-inchief provision is merely a military designation or title
that involves certain responsibilities--not a blanket grant
of military power.

Louis Henkin argues:

"There is no

evidence that the Framers contemplated any significant role-or authority--for the President as Commander in Chief when
there was no war."115 Edward Corwin adds that the

113
Quoted by Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts
between Congress and the President
(Princeton,
N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 285, quoting Youngstown
Co. v. Sawver. 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952).
114

Bennett et al., p. 32; Emerson, p. 28.

115
Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism. Democracy, and
Foreign Affairs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990),
p. 25.
Wormuth and Firmage similarly argue that the president
simply commands troops specifically designated by Congress and
is subject to congressional limitations (Wormuth and Firmage,
p. 121).
William Van Alstyne concurs:
"The President is
Commander-in-Chief only with regard to such armed forces as
Congress
provides,
and such uses
as
Congress
deems
appropriate."
(Bennett et al., p. 37).

40

commander-in-chief clause was largely forgotten by early
presidents until President Abraham Lincoln transformed its
significance by using it to justify his broad use of war
powers during the Civil War.116

David Grey Adler concurs

and states that the president's designation as commander-inchief conferred no independent warmaking authority.117
Alexander Hamilton explained that the president's power
as commander-in-chief was necessarily limited by the
legislature's war powers:
. . . the President is to be Commander in Chief of the
army and navy of the United States. In this respect
his authority would be nominally the same with that of
the King of Great Britain, but in substance much
inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than
the supreme command and direction of the military and
naval forces, as first General and Admiral of the
confederacy; while that of the British King extends to
the declaring of war and the raising and regulating of
fleets and armies; all which by the
Constitution under consideration would appertain to the
Legislature.118
After reviewing Hamilton's statement, Henkin argues:
"generals and admirals, even when they are 'first,' do not
determine the political purposes for which troops are to be
used; they command them in the execution of policy made by

116
4th ed.

Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers.
(New York: New York University Press, 1957) , p. 22 9.

117
Adler,
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others."119 Edwin Corwin agrees:

"in any war in which the

United States becomes involved--one presumably declared by
Congress--the President will be top general and top admiral
of the forces provided by Congress."120

Law professor

Raoul Berger similarly notes that the commander-in-chief
clause only designated the president as first general of
American forces.121 According to Lofgren, the commanderin-chief clause was passed without debate which indicates
that the military designation was commonly understood.122
The early Supreme Court similarly interpreted the
commander--in-chief clause as Justice Roger Taney explained
in Fleming v. Page (1850):
His (the president's) duty and his power are purely
military. As commander-in-chief, he is authorized to
direct the movements of the naval and military forces
placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the
manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer
and subdue the enemy.123
The Framers viewed the commander-in-chief as subject to
the will of Congress.

The Continental Congress, for

example, directed much of George Washington's military
119 Quoted by Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential
Warmaking," p. 13.
120
"There is
Commander
source of

Corwin, p. 229.
Schlesinger similarly concludes:
no evidence that anyone supposed that his office as
in Chief endowed the President with an independent
authority."
(Schlesinger, p. 6).

121
n. 66 .

Quoted by Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy, p. 82

122

Lofgren, p. 12.
9 Howard 603, 614 (U.S. 1850)
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activity in the Revolutionary War.

In fact, Washington's

commission of June 19, 1775, stated that he should
. . . observe and follow such orders and directions
from time to time as you shall receive from this or a
future congress of these United Colonies, or a
committee of congress, for that purpose appointed.124
David Grey Adler reviews the role of commander-in-chief in
English history and concludes that he was always subject to
a political superior.125
Because the Framers did not want the executive to have
the power to initiate war, they expressly (and with much
discussion as to its significance) granted that power to
Congress.

To interpret the commander-in-chief clause as a

grant of authority to the president to engage in military
activity, no matter how great its scope, undermines the
Framer's separation of powers and contravenes what appears
to have been the settled understanding of the term
commander-in-chief as a simple military title.

Alexander

Hamilton explained that the president as commander-in-chief
was simply "to have the direction of the war once authorized
or begun."126
124
Stone, p. 97.
It should be noted that Louis Henkin faults reliance on
George Washington's early role as commander-in-chief because
it ignores later extensive delegations of power to General
Washington and because it occurred prior to the creation of a
separate
and
independent
executive
branch
(Henkin,
Constitutionalism. Democracy and Foreign Affairs, p. 286).
125
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B.

EXECUTIVE POWER

The president also claims that the Constitution grants
him military authority as the holder of executive power.
This encompasses the responsibility to protect and insure
the safety of citizens at home and abroad.

Alexander

Hamilton broadly construed presidential executive power and
argued that it was only restricted by the enumerated
constitutional authority of Congress.127

Crovitz concurs

and argues that congressional grants of power in the
Constitution are defined in limited terms while presidential
powers are defined expansively.128 Eugene Rostow similarly
maintains that the president's preeminent foreign affairs
power is derived from his constitutional grant of executive
power.129

Rostow warns that Congress is usurping the

president's constitutional power over military operations
which he characterizes as "matters of executive
discretion. 1,130

127

Thomas and Thomas, p . 9 .

128

Crovitz, p. 107.

129

Quoted by Henkin, Glennon, and Rogers, p. 31.

130
Ibid., p. 32.
It is interesting to note that Gordon Crovitz and Eugene
Rostow refer to Congress as imperial and argue that it is
Congress who is now attempting to infringe on the president's
constitutional powers.
On the other hand, the majority of
scholars contend the opposite--that the president has become
imperial and has augmented his authority over war at the
expense of Congress. (Rourke and Farnen, p. 513; Yost, p. 415;
Steele, p. 1142) .
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On the other hand, James Madison viewed executive power
as narrowly limited to explicit grants of power in the
Constitution.

Adler and Berger explain that the Framers

discussed executive power and explicitly agreed that it
should not extend to powers of peace and war.131 Moreover,
the president cannot execute what Congress has not first
legislated.

Bickel underscores that the president requires

legislation to implement his powers:
Whatever is needed to flesh out the slender recital of
Executive functions must be done by Congress under the
"necessary and proper" clause. Congress alone can make
the laws which will carry into execution the powers of
the Government as a whole, and of its officers,
including the President.132
James Madison similarly stated:

"The natural providence of

the executive magistrate is to execute the laws as that of
the legislature is to make laws.

All his acts, therefore,

properly executive, must presuppose the existence of the
laws to be executed. 1,133

131
Adler,
"The Constitution and Presidential
Warmaking," pp. 14-15; Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy, p.
82 n. 6 6 .
When the creation of the national executive branch
was discussed at the Constitutional Convention and it was
proposed that the branch be granted the executive power of the
Continental Congress, Charles Pinckney worried that "the
Executive powers of (the existing Continental) Congress might
extend to peace and war which would render the Executive a
Monarchy of the worst kind, towit an elective one."
James
Madison and James Wilson reassured Pickney that making peace
and war were legislative matters. (quoted by Wormuth and
Firmage, pp. 17-18) .
132

Quoted by Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy, p. 73.
Quoted by Wormuth and Firmage, p. 16.
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Even if the president does have broad executive powers
in domestic affairs, the Constitution expressly grants
Congress authority to initiate hostilities.

The president's

executive powers, then, are terminated where express
constitutional provisions regarding war begin.134
Presidents have also argued that their foreign affairs
power authorizes the utilization of forces and arms abroad
in international conflicts as an instrument of foreign
policy.135

The president's foreign affairs authority is

derived from his executive power, treaty making power, and
power to receive ambassadors.136

In an often cited case on

the president's preeminent role in foreign affairs, United
States v. Curtiss-Wriaht Export Corporation (1936) , Justice
George Sutherland ruled that Congress could delegate

134

Yost, p. 421 n. 33.

135
While campaigning for president in 1988 before an
AmericanLegion Convention, George Bushfaulted Congress for
usurping presidential prerogatives in foreign affairs and
pledged to redress the perceived imbalance:
What kind of wacky world is this where the
President is taken to court every time he moves our
troops around in the national interest? Sometimes
a president must take risks for peace, and he
doesn't need to be blocked every step of the way
(quoted by Crovitz, p. 103) .
136
Contrary to presidential claims of plenary power
over foreign relations, several constitutional scholars argue
that
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to
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p. 177).

46

authority to the President to embargo the sale of arms to
Paraguay and Bolivia.137

Sutherland stated:

It is important to bear in mind that we are here
dealing not alone with an authority vested in the
President by an exertion of legislative power, but with
such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of
the federal government in the field of international
relations.138
The Court's ruling in Curtiss-Wright has been criticized on
numerous grounds. Most legal experts argue that
Sutherland's reference to the president as the "sole organ"
of foreign policy is merely unnecessary dicta and thus not
binding.139

Several authors also note that Sutherland's

use of former Representative John Marshall's "sole organ"
statement was misplaced as Marshall was only referring to
the president's role as exclusive communicator with other
governments.140

There has also been disagreement on

whether this case directly applies to war powers
controversies.
After reviewing and faulting the Court's reasoning in
Curtiss-Wriqht. Lofgren concludes that although the case
does not limit Congress' authority to declare war as the
Court recognized limitations on the president's use of

137
138
139

2 99 U.S. 304 (U.S. 1936).
Ibid., pp. 319-20.
Ibid., p. 20; Wormuth and Firmage, p. 181 n. 7.

140 Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy, p. 24; Wormuth
and Firmage, pp. 181-82.
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external powers, the ruling does "implicitly support
executive authority to use the armed forces in implementing
foreign policy objectives."141
On the other hand, Bickel argues that the holding in
Curtiss-Wright is limited to the facts in that case and does
not extend to war powers because the Court stated that
presidential powers "must be exercised in subordination to
the applicable provisions of the Constitution."142

Bickel

adds that the case says "nothing about the powers to go to
war or to use the armed forces without restriction."143
After criticizing Justice Sutherland's opinion in CurtissWright. Adler quotes Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. who similarly
contended:
The case itself involved the power to act under
congressional authorization, not the power to act
independently of Congress. Moreover, it involved the
power over foreign commerce, not the power over
war.144
It is illuminating to contrast the judicially created
"sole organ" doctrine with Alexander Hamilton's specific
reference to foreign policy in Federalist 75:

141

Lofgren, p. 204.

142

Bickel, p. 211.

143

Ibid.
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Quoted by Adler, "The Constitution and Presidential
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The history of human conduct does not warrant that
exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it
wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate a
momentous a kind, as those which concern its
intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole
disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as
would be the president of the United States.145
Although the president does have broad foreign policy
powers, he is far from the "sole organ" in international
affairs.

Congress has been given an explicit constitutional

role in several critical areas of foreign policy:

Congress

regulates commerce between the U.S. and other nations; the
Senate has treaty ratification powers; and Congress has
significant war powers.

While the president should have

some flexibility to use the military to protect and promote
American interests abroad, this power is necessarily limited
by certain enumerated grants of authority to Congress.
Political and military decisions regarding America's
national interests abroad should not be made by the
commander-in-chief alone, but should emerge (as the Framers
intended) from a dialogue between the executive and
legislative branches.

While the president may have the

authority to deploy limited numbers of troops
internationally, he cannot take action that, as a practical
matter, constitutes war.

In other words, the president's

right to use gun boat diplomacy depends on the size of the
boat.

Quoted in Cooke, pp. 505-06.

C.

CONSTITUTIONAL CUSTOM

President Bush, like other presidents before him, also
argued that the repeated historic practice of international
presidential military actions created a precedent providing
authority for his prosecution of the Persian Gulf Crisis.
The President stated:

"history is replete with examples

where the President has had to take action. 1,146 The
executive branch emphasized that American presidents had
used the armed forces abroad more than 200 times.

However,

a closer examination of history supports the Framers' more
conservative view of presidential power.
Early American presidents were especially deferential
of the war powers of Congress.

America's quasi-war with

France in 1798, although not preceded by a declaration of
war, was debated by Congress and authorized through a series
of legislation.147

In his first message to Congress in

1801, President Jefferson requested guidance from Congress
in dealing with threats against American ships from the
Pasha of Tripoli.

Jefferson stated that he was

"unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of
Congress, to go beyond the line of defense;"
authorize "measures of offense also."148

Congress must

President Andrew

Jackson similarly viewed his war-making powers as limited by
146

Hansen, p. 29.

147

Fisher, "The Power of Commander in Chief," p. 49.
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Congress.

He refused to recognize Texas and referred the

issue to Congress as a question "probably leading to war"
and thus a subject for "that body by whom war can alone be
declared. 1,149
When President James Polk ordered the army to occupy
disputed territory with Mexico in 1846 and started the
Mexican American War, he was censured by the House.
President Lincoln did take unilateral military action during
the Civil War; however, his actions were later upheld by the
Supreme Court as defensive.150 The Court explained that
the President was "bound to resist force by force.

He does

not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge
without waiting for any legislative authority. 1,151 The
next three major conflicts:

the Spanish American War of

1898, World War I, and World War II, were all formally
declared by Congress.
President Truman's unilateral deployment of troops to
Korea in 1950 signaled a new era of presidential military

149 Quoted by Schlesinger, p. 29.
150 Ironically enough, while a congressperson Lincoln was
an eloquent critic of Polk's actions. When asked whether Polk
should have been allowed to determine if an invasion of Mexico
was necessary, Lincoln famously responded:
Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation,
whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion
. . . and you allow him to make war at pleasure. Study
to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this
respect. (Ibid., p. 42).
151

Ibid. , p . 51.
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committments abroad.152
authorized by Congress.

The Korean War was not explicitlyThe Vietnam War, although initially

sanctioned by Congress through the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
in 1964, was later repudiated by Congress through the repeal
of that Resolution and other express legislation curtailing
military appropriations.

With the exception of Korea and

Vietnam nearly all the other examples of presidental
military activity cited by the executive branch as
precedents were minor incidents involving small numbers of
troops and material.

With the exception of Korea, no other

presidential unilateral military committment approached the
scale of the Persian Gulf War.
The Supreme Court first introduced the idea of
constitutional custom in Stuart v. Laird (1803).

There the

Court held that where the interpretation of a constitutional
clause is doubtful, practice and acquiescence over years can
fix construction.153

In a separate opinion in the Steele

Seizure Case. Justice Felix Frankfurter elaborated on the
doctrine of "quasi-constitutional custom:"

152
President Dwight Eisenhower, however, faulted
Truman's unilateral exercise of military force in Korea. As
president, he requested congressional authority to act in the
Middle East and the Straits of Formosa.
(Fisher, "Historical
Survey," pp. 22-23).
153
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systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued
to the knowledge of the Congress and never before
questioned. . . making it as it were such an exercize
of power part of the structure of government, may be
treated as a gloss on 'executive power' vested in the
President by section 1 of Article II.154
Prior presidential uses of military force without sanction
of Congress do not meet these requirements. As previously
mentioned, they were largely minor actions.

Moreover, many

of the instances cited by the executive were actually
legimized or authorized by Congress through affirmative
legislation.

Finally, Congress has repeatedly questioned

the executive branch's post-Korean War assertion that the
president is authorized to initiate military action without
the approval of Congress.

It did so in Vietnam when the

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was repealed.

It did so in 1973

when the War Powers Resolution, a congressional attempt to
restrict presidential war powers, was passed.

It did so in

1982 when the requirements of the War Powers Resolution were
imposed upon President Reagan's deployment of Marines in
Lebanon.

And it did so when Congress debated and passed the

Resolution authorizing President Bush to use force in the
Persian Gulf.
After discussing the list of presidential uses of power
abroad in detail and concluding that the majority were
trivial actions, Firmage and Wormuth argue that the "quasi-

154 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 72 S.Ct. 863 ,
897 (U.S. 1952) .
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constitutional custom" doctrine does not apply.

They

explain:
In the case of executive wars, none of the conditions
for the establishment of constitutional power by usage
is present. The Constitutional is not ambiguous. No
contemporaneous congressional interpretation attrubutes
a power of initiating war to the President. The early
Presidents, and indeed everyone in the country until
the year 1950, denied that the President possessed such
a power. There is no sustained body of usage to
support such a claim.155
Even if prior examples of presidential uses of force
abroad had been substantially similar to the Persian Gulf
War and met the factual requirements of the "quasiconstitutional custom" doctrine, they would still constitute
an unconstitutional expansion of executive power.
Unconstitutional actions cannot change the meaning of the
Constitution.156

Moreover, the president should not be

allowed to augment his power through continuous
usurpation.157
III.

CONCLUSION

The Persian Gulf War is a classic example of
presidential military action which clearly exceeds
constitutional boundaries.

The Persian Gulf deployment

occurred on a massive scale over a period of months.
Congress should have and could have been meaningfully
155
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156 John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility (Princeton:
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157
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consulted.

If a national consensus for war did not exist in

November, President Bush should not have committed to it
publicly.

The Constitution requires more.

CHAPTER 3
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

The constitutional debate regarding the appropriate
separation of war powers between Congress and the president
reached its zenith in 1973 when Congress adopted the War
Powers Resolution (WPR) over President Richard Nixon's veto.
Enacted largely as a response to unilateral presidential
military activity in Vietnam, the WPR attempts to restrict
the president's power to intervene militarily in hostile
situations and also seeks to define Congress' role in
determining when and how American forces will be engaged.
Since 1973, legislators have repeatedly raised the
requirements of the WPR as a basis for asserting that the
president should discuss and receive authorization for
large-scale troop deployments.

However, every president

since the Resolution's enactment has refused to recognize
the its

constitutionality and meaningfully comply with its

provisions.

Proponents of the WPR assert that it is a

necessary measure to curb executive military excesses and to
return to the separation of war powers outlined in the
55

Constitution.

The Resolution's critics contend that it

unconstitutionally restrains the president from exercising
his powers as commander-in-chief and head of foreign policy.
Both supporters and critics of the Resolution concur that it
has not functioned as intended and should be amended.
President Bush's broad assertion of war powers renewed
debate on this controversial resolution.

Although the

President stated that his initial report was "consistent
with" the WPR, he later ignored its provisions.

Congress,

on the other hand, repeatedly referred to the Resolution in
legislation relating to the Gulf War.

In fact, after the

use of force resolution was adopted in early January, House
Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Dante Fascell stated that
the WPR was functioning--the President had filed a WPR
report, Congress debated, and legislation was passed
providing authorization pursuant to the Resolution.
Faschell optimistically concluded:

"the War Powers

Resolution is alive and well."158

Considering the

President's evasion of the WPR and Congress' unwillingness
to impose its requirements, Faschell's optimism was somewhat
misplaced.
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Ellen C. Collier, "Statutory Constraints: The War
Powers Resolution, " in The Constitution and the Power to Go to
War, p. 24.
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II.

THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
A.

BACKGROUND

President Nixon's continuation of the Vietnam War
despite congressional disapproval illustrated the practical
difficulties Congress experienced playing a role in modern
military conflicts.

Therefore, Congress outlined and

codified what it perceived its war making authority to be in
the WPR.

According to political scientist James Nathan,

three political assumptions underlay the adoption of the
WPR:
(1) that U.S. armed forces should not enter hostilities
without adequate domestic support, (2) that only a
compelling national interest should dictate a
commitment of troops, and (3) that the Congress
provided a kind of "reality test" for the President in
these matters.159
Drafters of the WPR recognized that Congress has
historically attempted to avoid the politically troublesome
issues of war and peace.

They hoped the Resolution would

require legislative action where Congress had previously
chosen to remain silent.160 The WPR was also passed
because Congress acknowledged its inability to act quickly
and desired a mechanism to expedite debate.161
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Interestingly enough, the WPR has divided both liberals
and conservatives.

It was opposed by a unique alliance of

liberals who thought it gave the president too much power
and conservatives who believed it infringed on the
president's authority as commander-in-chief .162

It was

supported by those who argued that the president had
exceeded his constitutional authority and usurped
congressional power to decide when hostilities should be
initiated.
B.

TEXT

The text of the Resolution is illustrative of its
potential as a procedural device for delineating war powers
and also its constitutional and practical problems.

The

Resolution's express purpose as explained in Section 2(a) is
to :
(E)nsure that the collective judgment of both the
Congress and the President will apply to the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into
hostilities, or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces
in hostilities or in such situations.163
Section 2(c) states that executive power as commander-inchief to deploy forces into hostilities or areas of imminent
hostilities is limited to:

"1) a declaration of war, 2)

162
Stuart W. Darling, "Rethinking the War Powers Act,"
Presidential Studies Quarterly 7 (Spring/Summer 1977), p. 127.
163
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specific statutory authorization, 3) a national emergency
created by attack upon the United States" or its forces or
territories abroad.

Section 3 provides:

The President in every possible instance shall consult
with Congress before introducing United States Armed
Forces into hostilities, or into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances, and after every such
introduction shall consult regularly with Congress . .
Sections 2 and 3 are in the "Purpose and Policy" portion of
the Resolution and as such are not considered binding.
Section 4 (a) requires the president to report to
Congress within 48 hours of the introduction of military
forces into a number of circumstances including situations
of imminent hostilities (section 4(a)(1)).

Section 5(b)

states that when a section 4(a)(1) report of imminent
hostilities is required by military commitments, the
president shall terminate the use of armed forces within 60
days unless Congress has declared war or specifically
authorized a continued use of force by statute.

This

section further provides that Congress can extend the 60 day
limit for no more than 30 days or that Congress may require
the removal of troops by concurrent resolution (not subject
to presidential veto) prior to the expiration of 60 days.
Sections 6 and 7 discuss expedited procedures for joint and
concurrent resolutions.
Section 8(a) explains that authority to commit troops
shall not be inferred from any provision that does not
specifically refer to the War Powers Resolution.

The
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section additionally states that "nothing in this joint
resolution . . .

is intended to alter the constitutional

authority of the Congress or the President.

. ."

Section 9

contains a provision stating that if any section of the
Resolution is found to be unconstitutional the rest of the
Resolution is severable and will remain valid.
This controversial Resolution has been vigorously
attacked on a variety of grounds and has never functioned as
its drafters intended.
C.

PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE

The WPR played a significant role in the debate during
the Persian Gulf Crisis.

As Chapter 1 indicated, Congress

repeatedly raised its requirements to pressure President
Bush into obtaining authorization prior to taking offensive
action.

Except for describing his notification to Congress

of the initial troop deployment in August as "consistent
with" the WPR, President Bush virtually ignored its
provisions.

The President never conceded that the 60 day

time period had commenced nor did he refer to the Resolution
when he notified Congress in November 1991 that troop
strength would be doubled.
The text of the WPR indicates that it should have
applied to the Persian Gulf crisis in three ways.

First,

President Bush should have consulted with Congress prior to
deploying additional troops after the initial emergency
expired.

Second, he should have fully informed Congress
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within 4 8 hours of the troop commitment and the 60 day time
clock should have been triggered.

Third, within the 60 day

period Congress should have determined whether the U.S.
forces would take an offensive or defensive posture.164
President Bush's evasion of the WPR was not novel.
Although 25 reports have been issued by the executive since
19 73 ,165 nearly all have simply declared themselves
"consistent with" the WPR.

This term has been used by

presidents in order to placate Congress without explicitly
recognizing the Resolution's constitutionality.

A section

4(a)(1) report of hostilities was filed in 1975 by President
Gerald Ford regarding the Mayaguez rescue mission.

However,

the mission was completed by the time the report was filed.
In countless other instances since 1973, presidents have
used force abroad without filing any report.
Congress has only formally invoked the WPR once.

When

President Reagan initially deployed 12 00 marines on a
peacekeeping mission to Lebanon in September 1982, he
refused to submit a section 4(a)(1) hostilities report.

As

the Lebanese situation deteriorated and several marines were
killed, Congress threatened to commence the 60 day time
period and force a troop withdrawal.

After President Reagan

and Congress negotiated, the President agreed to sign a
164
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resolution acknowledging imminent hostilities in exchange
for authorization to extend the marines' mission by 18
months.
It appeared initially that President Bill Clinton might
explicitly recognize the legality of the WPA and forge a
more open foreign policy relationship with a Congress
controlled by his own party.

He consulted extensively with

Congress to formulate his policy toward Haiti during his
first year in office.

Subsequently, however, he sent cruise

missiles to Iraq without meaningfully consulting with
Congress.

When he notified Congress of the attack, he

called his report "consistent with" the WPR.166
President Clinton evoked his evasive Republican
predecessors by virtually ignoring Congress in the fall of
1994.

He publicly announced the U.S. would invade Haiti on

September 18 without consulting Congress or receiving
authorization as required by the WPR.

Although the invasion

was aborted by last-minute diplomacy, Haiti's military
leaders did not agree to leave until the first American
planes had actually been launched.167

Congress, the

majority of whom opposed President Clinton's Haiti policy,
debated the issue along largely partisan lines.

Republicans

166 Gregory J. Bowens, "Iraq: Bombing, Widely Backed on
Hill, Reopens War Powers Debate," Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report 51 (July 3, 1993), p. 1750.
167 George Church, "Destination Haiti, " Time (September
26, 1994), p. 23.
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who had supported President Bush in Panama and the Persian
Gulf, now argued that the Constitution and the WPR required
the President to consult with Congress prior to invading
Haiti.

Democratic legislators responded that the proposed

Haitan invasion was a much smaller operation than the two
previous actions.168
Although Congress itself has consistently found the WPR
unworkable, few legislators want to concede the law is
invalid.169

It has been raised, perhaps effectively, as a

threat to force President Clinton to discuss military
peacekeeping missions with Congress.170

Legislation

authorizing presidential military activity continues to
refer to the WPR.171
III.

THE DEBATE

The difficulty of reviewing the WPR is that there are
as many opinions regarding the Resolution as there are

168
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170
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authors who have discussed its provisions.
variously described as:

The WPR has been

"an abysmal failure; 1,172 "deeply

flawed;"173 "unconstitutional, ineffective, and
unwise;"174 a "useful congressional negotiating tool;"175
"plainly constitutional;176

and finally, as "just another

element in the political struggle between the branches."177

The complexity of the debate is complicated by the fact
that political scientists and legal scholars approach the
WPR differently.

Political scientists generally focus on

whether or not the legislation constitutes good policy.
Legal scholars discuss its constitutionality and propose
specific legislative modifications.

Opponents articulately

challenge the Resolution as both unconstitutional and bad
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Desert Storm," Mercer Law Review 43 (Winter 1992), p. 646.
173

Firmage, p. 23 7.

174
Quoted by John C. Cruden, Review of The War Powers
Resolution:
Its Implementation in Theory and Practice, by
Robert Turner, Virginia Journal of International Law 24
(Winter 1984), p. 514.
175
Donna Haynes Henry, "The War Powers Resolution: A
Tool for Balancing Power Through Negotiation, " Virginia Law
Review 70 (June 1984), p. 1054.
176
Ely, "Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that
Worked," p. 13 86.
177
Harvard

"Realism, Liberalism and the War PowersResolution, "
Law Review 102 (January 1989), p. 638.
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policy while equally eloquent proponents defend it on both
grounds.
A.
1.

OPPONENTS

CONSTITUTIONALITY

The most common criticism of the WPR is that it is
unconstitutional.

The executive branch has consistently

opposed the Resolution and never meaningfully complied with
its requirements.

No president has ever formally consulted

with Congress prior to committing troops.178 Moreover,
every president since the Resolution was passed has
contended that it unconstitutionally undermines his power as
commander-in-chief and chief executive.
Law professors Philip Trimble and Geoffrey Miller state
that the Resolution is unconstitutional because the
president's constitutional powers can be regulated only by
specific congressional legislation.179

Congress cannot

limit presidential action in advance through broadly phrased
general restrictions.180 A different constitutional
criticism is levied by former cabinet member and ambassador
Elliott Richardson.

He believes the Resolution undermines

178
Joshua Lee Prober, "Congress, the War Powers
Resolution, and the Secret Political Life of a 'Dead Letter,'"
Journal of Law and Politics 7 (Fall 1990), p. 177.
179
Quoted in "War Powers and the Responsibility of
Congress," Proceedings of the 82nd Annual Meeting, American
Society of International Law 82 (1988), p. 10.
Charles Bennett et al., p. 32.
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the system of checks and balances by attempting to delineate
constitutional powers and eliminate the institutional
competition and compromise the Founders intended.181
Opponents of the Resolution further fault the
enumeration of presidential powers in section 2 as
unconstitutionally underinclusive. They argue that the
president does not derive all his constitutional war powers
from the commander-in-chief clause and that he can introduce
troops pursuant to his power:

to execute commitments under

security treaties, to act as the sole voice in foreign
policy, and to act as the nation's chief executive.182
Legal scholars Ann and A.J. Thomas more specifically
criticize section 8(a)(2) which states that presidential
authority to use force should not be inferred from treaty
commitments.

They argue that this provision is

unconstitutional because treaties, such as our security
alliance with NATO, are the supreme law of the land and the
president has a constitutional duty to see that they are
faithfully executed.103

181
Elliott L. Richardson, "Checks and Balances in
Foreign Relations," American Journal of International Law 83
(October 1989), p. 738.
182

Thomas and Thomas, p. 133.

183
Ibid., p. 137.
Senator Javits responds that
international treaties specify they will be carried out in
accordance with the "constitutional processes of the nations
involved" and the WPR merely defines those processes.
(Jacob
K. Javits, Who Makes War (New York:
William Morrow & Co.,
1973), p. 268).
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Critics also assert that presidents have historically
committed armed forces in hostile situations and this has
set a precedent that the WPR cannot change.184

Eugene

Rostow, a prominent proponent of executive power, affirms
that the president has often taken military action without
consulting Congress and this has created a practice which
gives meaning to the Constitution.185 A leading State
Department critic of the WPR, Abraham Sofaer, notes the
extensive number of presidential uses of force without
congressional authorization and concludes that the president
has "ample authority under the Constitution" to act
militarily without specific legislative authority.186
2.

POLICY

After reviewing the Resolution's constitutional
failings, opponents further assert that it constitutes bad
1
Senator Tom Eagleton refers to this argument as the
"bank robber theory," e.g. if numerous bank robberies were
successful, the act of robbing banks should be legalized.
(Thomas F. Eagleton, War and Presidential Power (New York:
Liveright, 1974), p. 125).
Senator Brock Adams adds that even if a precedent was
established, it was negated by passage of the WPR. (quoted in
"War Powers and the Responsibility of Congress," p. 3).
Michael Glennon reviews the enumeration of unilateral
presidential actions and concludes that the vast majority were
minor instances which do not justify presidential claims of
augmented military authority. (Glennon, "The Gulf War and the
Constitution," pp. 89-90).
185 Rostow, "President, Prime Minister or Constitutional
Monarch," p. 744.
186
Abraham D. Sofaer, "The War Powers Resolution:
Fifteen Years Later," Temple Law Review 62 (Spring 1989), p.
321.
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policy.

Legal advisor Terry Emerson believes that the WPR

precipitates a vote over military action before reasoned and
deliberative judgment can occur.187 Sofaer adds that the
WPR "will lead to unnecessary and undesirable legal faceoffs
between Congress and the President, when the nation most
needs to implement foreign policy effectively and
wisely."188

Thus, the Resolution transforms what should be

a political debate into a legal debate.189
Opponents further assert that the Resolution
excessively limits presidential power over foreign affairs.
Emerson contends that the Resolution is "dangerous to the
country's safety because it denies flexibility to the
President in the conduct of foreign relations and conveys a
message of political disunity in the American
Government."190 Ann and A.J. Thomas concur and maintain
that the WPR detrimentally removes the threat of
presidential use of force in his dealings with other
nations.191 The Resolution's critics argue that the
president must be able to act quickly to prevent global
187

Emerson, p. 31.

188

Sofaer, p. 317.

189
Military law professor John Rolph similarly
criticizes the WPR for fostering detailed constitutional and
legal arguments rather than a discussion of the political
merits of the president's proposed military policy. (Rolph, p.
650) .
190

Emerson, p. 51.

191

Thomas and Thomas, p. 138.
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crises and protect American interests and citizens
abroad.192

They also point out the need for secrecy in any

military situation and claim that consulting with Congress
prior to troop deployments may compromise the security of
American forces.
Liberal commentators criticize the Resolution for
dramatically different reasons.

For example, Senator

Eagleton (one of the authors of the Senate version of the
Resolution) and Representative Charles Bennett argue that
the modified Resolution passed by both Houses granted the
president excessive power because it does not require
congressional approval prior to troop commitments, and then
grants him 60 days to act unilaterally.193

Law professor

Edwin Firmage adds that the Resolution is "deeply flawed"
for two reasons.

First, if the president rapidly concludes

any military deployment it would be difficult for Congress
to challenge his action.

Second, once troops are deployed

it becomes difficult for Congress to oppose the president
and remove the troops.194

192 President Nixon specifically addressed this concern
in his veto message to the House. He stated that the effect
of the WPR would be to "seriously undermine this Nation's
ability to act decisively and convincingly in times of
international crisis."
(quoted by William P. Agee, "The War
Powers
Resolution:
Congress
Seeks
to Reassert
Its
Constitutional Role as a Partner in War Making," Rutgers Law
Journal 18 (Winter 1987), p. 405).
193

Bennett et al., p. 31.
Firmage, p. 23 7.
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B.
1.

PROPONENTS

CONSTITUTIONALITY

Proponents of the War Powers Resolution counter that
the President has preempted Congress in military affairs and
violated the constitutional separation of powers.

They

assert that the Resolution is clearly constitutional as it
encompasses the war powers of Congress.
explained:

Senator Brock Adams

The Constitution makes it clear that the power

to declare war is in the hands of the Congress. . . the
resolution is an exercise of part of that constitutional
power. 1,195 Law professor William Van Alstyne bases his
view of the Resolution's constitutionality on provisions of
the Constitution other than the declaration clause.

He

finds the WPR's authority in Congress' exclusive power to
determine whether the U.S. will have an army or navy and on
Congress' power to make all laws that are necessary and
proper.196
Constitutional scholars John Hart Ely, Michael
Glennon, Lawrence Tribe, and Alexander Bickel conclude the
Framers clearly intended that all wars, whether declared or
undeclared, be legislatively authorized.197

In discussing

the WPR, constitutional expert Louis Henken similarly
195
Quoted in "War Powers and the Responsibility of
Congress," p . 3.
196

Bennett et a l ., p. 26.

197 Ely, "Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that
Worked," p . 1386.
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explained that Congress has the power to limit or regulate
uses of force in situations of war and those short of
war.198

Law Professor William Spong elaborated:

In enacting the Resolution, Congress did not seek to
change the constitutional powers of the President.
What they hoped to create was a procedural mechanism
for coordinating the war and peace constitutional
responsibilities of the President and Congress, a
procedure that would bring Congress to a position where
it might exercise its proper role.199
Glennon responds to opponents of the Resolution's time
limits on presidential military action by stating that their
argument applies to any constitutional limitation on
presidential power. 200

Legal commentator Stephen Carter

avoids the original intent conundrum by asserting that the
WPR is constitutional as a mechanism effectuating Congress'
role in a system of checks and balances.201
2.

POLICY

After defending the Resolution's constitutionality,
supporters of the WPR explain that it also constitutes good
policy.

Bickel counters pragmatic critiques of the WPR and

contends that clarifying congressional control over war
198 Louis Henken, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution
(Mineola, N.Y.:
The Foundation Press, 1972), p. 103.
199 William B. Spong, Jr., "The American Constitutional
War Powers From Afar--Another Look," Federal Law Review 19
(March 1990), p. 105.
200

Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy, p. 95.

201 Stephen L. Carter, "The Constitutionality of the War
Powers Resolution," Virginia Law Review 70 (February 19 84), p.
112 .
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powers will enhance American credibility abroad by requiring
the U.S. to make commitments through specific and binding
legislation. 202

Political scientist Morton Halperin adds

that congressional participation is necessary for the
success of foreign policy and military policy.
elaborates:

He

"The benefits of public consensus on military

action far outweigh the conceivable loss to some
opportunities stemming from public debate and congressional
approval.1,203
Proponents of the Resolution such as Stuart Darling
argue that it is dangerous to allow one person to make
decisions regarding war and that executive expediency must
be balanced by legislative restraint. 204

Legal scholar

Steven Shuster adds that the Resolution is necessary to
avoid gradually escalating conflicts and political quagmires
such as Vietnam; promoting the rule of law is always
beneficial in the long-term.

As constitutional expert Jules

202 Alexander Bickel, Introduction to Javits, Who Makes
War, p. x i . Historian Barbara Tuchman denies that Congress'
role in war is obsolete in the modern world. She eloquently
explains:
Now the need for constitutional reform has become
apparent, not to restore the eighteenth-century
model, but to confirm its classic balance of powers
and validate its restraints upon the Executive for
late-twentieth-century conditions. The War Powers
Act is the first step. (Barbara W. Tuchman, Ibid.,
p. vii).
203

Halperin,
Darling,

"Lawful Wars," p. 175.
p. 134.
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Lobel explained, democratic government is diminished when
the executive is able to abuse constitutional power on the
pretext of national security.205
In reply to the contention that the Resolution was
simply a response to Vietnam, Halperin argues that the WPR
had a "deeper source, 11 which was to reestablish Congress'
role in decisions regarding war. 206

Although proponents

of the WPR concede that it needs to be amended to be
effective, they view it as both beneficial and necessary.
James Nathan argues that even though presidents have
systematically flouted the Resolution's restrictions, the
existence of the War Powers Resolution may have checked
further presidential forays abroad and limited the extent of
presidential military involvements.

In fact, Nathan

contends, if not for the Resolution, President Bush might
have disregarded Congress entirely in the Gulf War.207
Former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance similarly states that
the WPR has increased "presidential self-restraint" by
reminding the president he must gain political support prior
to exercising force. 208

Shuster adds that the Resolution's

205
Jules Lobel, "Emergency Power and the Decline of
Liberalism," Yale Law Journal 98 (May 1989), p. 1422.
206
207

Halperin, "Lawful Wars," p. 189.
Nathan, "Curbing the Distress of War," p. 626.

208 Cyrus R. Vance, "Striking the Balance: Congress and
the President under the War Powers Resolution," University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 133 (December 1984), p. 90.
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"mere existence forces Congress to debate military
decisions" even when presidents fail to comply with the
letter of the law.209
Legal scholar Joshua Prober carries the argument
further and claims that the Resolution is a beneficial and
powerful political tool to use against the president.

It

gives Congress the ability to criticize the president for
not complying with the Resolution rather than criticizing
him for a potentially popular military action.210

It

should be remembered that the success of the WPR should not
be based exclusively on the success of its operative
provisions, but also on achieving its goal of assuring
Congress a voice regarding presidential military
activity.211
Interestingly enough, political scientist William Olson
considers the debate and concludes that both sides are right
because the Constitution divides authority over foreign
affairs and the arguments are based upon different
provisions.

He views the Resolution as a political, not

legal, statement and notes that the Resolution's problem is

Shuster, p. 487
Prober, p. 179.
Henry, p. 1057.

75

not constitutionality but enforceability since it does not
contemplate sanctions against recalcitrant presidents.212
The debate over the WPR is clearly an extenuation of
the disagreement created by fundamentally different
interpretations of the Constitution.

History indicates,

then, that there may never be any consensus on the
Resolution's constitutionality.

Irrespective of its legal

and practical flaws, however, the WPR can provide a useful
framework for political accommodation and negotiation in war
powers disputes.

It will remain impotent, however, if

Congress does not aggressively pursue its co-equal role and
amend and enforce its requirements.213
IV.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

Considering the diametrically opposed interpretations
of the constitutionality and efficacy of the WPR it is not
surprising that the Resolution has never functioned as
intended.

John Hart Ely explains that the WPR has not

worked because of presidential defiance, congressional
acquiescence, and judicial abstention.214

Rather than

discarding the WPR, however, numerous legislators and

212 William C. Olson, "The US Congress: An Independent
Force in World Politics," International Affairs 67 (Summer
1991), p. 548.
213
Martin Wald, "The Future of the War Powers
Resolution," Stanford Law Review 36 (July 1984), p. 1409.
214 Ely, "Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that
Worked," p. 1381.
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prominent legal scholars have sought to revise the
Resolution with a plethora of proposed amendments.215
A.

SECTION 2

Section 2 of the WPR has been criticized as
underinclusive and (in any event) non-binding.

Thus, a

bipartisan group proposed an amendment (the Byrd proposal)
that would have, among other things, repealed section 2(c)
which enumerates the executive's power as commander-inchief .

Several commentators on the WPR such as Sofaer and

Shuster continue to support this modification to give the
president more flexibility in foreign policy.
On the other hand, WPR advocate Glennon argues that the
provision is simply unduly narrow and should be amended to
include the inherent presidential power to rescue endangered
Americans.216

Glennon, Thomas Franck, and Morton Halperin

favor expanding the list of presidential powers further and
propose retrieving the original Senate proposal that would
mandatorily require congressional approval prior to troop
commitments except in the enumerated circumstances.

Glennon

215
Given the controversial constitutionality of the
WPR, at least three authors suggest that the Constitution be
amended to provide for congressional consultation.
(Ray
Forrester,
"Presidential War in the Nuclear Age:
An
Unresolved Problem," George Washington Law Review 57 (August
1989), p. 1639; Rourke and Farnen, p. 518).
Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy, p. 96.
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and Franck suggest that a funding prohibition be attached to
encourage presidential compliance.217
Glennon, Shuster, and Henken, among others,
additionally recommend that the term "hostilities" be
defined clearly to reduce the possibility of presidents
evading the Resolution by claiming their military activity
does not involve hostilities-repeatedly in the past.218

a situation that has arisen

The House committee report on

the Resolution found that the term "hostilities" was broadly
intended to include "any state of confrontation in which
there is clear and present danger of armed conflict."219
Shuster uniquely suggests that the definition should be
drafted by both the executive and legislative branches to
assist in forging a consensus on future troop
engagements.220
B.

SECTION 3

Several supporters of the WPR argue that the
consultation requirement in section 3 be strengthened and
consultation defined.
217

Presidents have misinterpreted this

Ibid., p. 115.

218
To avoid semantic hairsplitting, hostilities could
be defined by a concrete occurrence such as a specified number
of U.S. casualties or by deployed troops receiving combat pay.
("Realism, Liberalism and the War Powers Resolution," p. 65051) .
219
Quoted by Shuster, p. 459 (H.R. Rep. No. 287, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973).
220

Ibid., p. 496.
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section and have informed Congress of military activity
rather than having meaningfully consulted with them prior it
its initiation.221

The section should also be amended to

specify which legislators should be consulted as a
discussion with Congress as a whole would admittedly be too
cumbersome. 222

It has been suggested that a "Permanent

Consultative Group" be created which would consist of the
leadership of both the House and Senate and various
committees. This group would meet on a regular basis with
the president to be consulted on possible U.S. military
action. 223

Commentators emphasize that, where possible,

consultation must occur before troops are deployed and
patriotic fervor makes a negative congressional response
impossible.
Although Representative Lee Hamilton favors clarifying
the consultation requirement, he insightfully adds that the
Resolution will work if there is an attitude of good faith
and mutual respect; however, if those attributes are lacking

221
Edwin Firmage adds that the term "consultation" be
defined as "genuine collaborative decision-making" before
troops are deployed. (Firmage, p. 257).
222
Ely, "Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that
Worked," pp. 14 00-01.
223
Eugene Rostow opposes the creation of a permanent
consulting group as it would require a congressional voice in
presidential
decision-making and
"destroy the unitary
Presidency, one of the two great innovations of the American
Constitution."
(Rostow,
"President,
Prime Minister or
Constitutional Monarch, p. 749).
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then the Resolution will not function no matter how the
consultation portion is amended.224
C.

SECTION 4

Another loophole of the WPR that presidents have
consistently exploited is its failure to require the
president to specify what type of section 4 report he is
filing.

Because only a section 4(a)(1) report

authomatically trigger the time constraint, the president
can report to Congress without commencing the 60 day
period. 225

Thus, presidents have sent reports of military

activity to Congress and described them simply as
"consistent with" the''•Resolution.

A more detailed reporting

requirement might help to minimize presidential evasion.226
Because sections 3 and 4 are not explicit, Nathan adds that
presidents have used the reporting requirement in lieu of
the consultation requirement and merely informed Congress of

224 Quoted in War Powers and the Constitution, p. 13.
General Scowcroft, an opponent of the Resolution, stated it
differently: "The trouble is that with the right spirit we do
not need the War Powers Resolution; with the wrong spirit, the
War Powers Resolution really does not affect the executive."
(Ibid., p. 16).
225

Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy, p. 104.

226 Ely and Glennon propose that section 4(a) (2) and
4(a)(3) be eliminated as those reports do not trigger the 60
day clock and thus give the President a loophole to report but
not berequired to remove troops.
(Ely, "Suppose Congress
Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked," p. 1404; Glennon,
Constitutional Diplomacy, p. 115).
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their actions.

The WPR could also be amended to provide for

the report's secrecy.227
Ely argues that this section should also be modified to
state that if the president fails to start the clock by
filing a section 4(a)(1) report, one or more members of
Congress should have standing to file suit in federal
court. 228

Interestingly enough, Ely does not want the

court to decide whether hostilities have actually commenced.
Rather, he contends that the court should merely remand the
case to Congress and force them to make a decision regarding
whether the clock has been started by deploying troops in a
situation of hostilities. 229 Other commentators similarly
support adding language to the amendment promoting judicial
review; however, they argue that the court is best qualified
to adjudicate possible violations of the Resolution. 230 As
227
Quoted in Francis 0. Wilcox and Richard A. Frank,
eds., The Constitution and the Conduct of Foreign Policy (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), pp. 119-20.
228
Glennon argues, on the other hand, that the
Resolution is a "dead letter" if Congress is forced to
determine when the clock should start for its drafters
intended the Resolution to be a self-starting mechanism
voluntarily initiated by the president.
(Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy, pp. 105-106).
229 Ely, "Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that
Worked," p. 1406. This seems ironically circuitous. Ely is
saying that Congress does not have the courage to directly
challenge the president and decide by resolution whether
hostilities have begun so the Court should order them to do
so.
It seems that if Congress will not determine that
hostilities have begun on its own, a court order would be
ineffective.
230

Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy, p. 112.
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Edwin Firmage explains:

"Whether we go to war is a

political question to be decided by Congress.

. . . The wav

we go to war is not."231
D.

SECTION 5(B)

Most supporters of the Resolution recognize that one of
its primary problems is that it grants the president 60 days
to deploy troops and thus present Congress with a fait
accompli which Congress, as a practical matter, will rarely
have the political will to overcome.

To combat this

problem, Stuart Darling agrees with other commentators that
the WPR be amended along the lines of the original Senate
version.

This would require that Congress approve of troop

commitments prior to their deployment except in several
narrowly defined emergencies. 232 According to Darling,
this would still allow the president to act unilaterally
when vital U.S. interests are threatened.233
Ely argues that granting the president 60 days (plus a
possible additional 30 days) is too generous.

He would

amend section 5 to give the president only 30 days to deploy

231

Firmage, p. 264.

232

Darling, p. 133.

233
Glennon further suggests that the Resolution's
restraints be enlarged to cover covert activity.
(Glennon,
Constitutional Diplomacy, p. 17) . Douglas Steele concurs and
suggests that the language covering covert operations be
broadly drafted and provide for the requisite secrecy.
(Steele, pp. 1156-57).
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troops without Congress' explicit approval. 234

Ely and

Glennon strongly argue that there must be a time limitation
placed1on presidential military activity or the president
would be permitted to leave troops indefinitely.235
Because of its controversial nature, other proponents
of the WPR favor removing the 60 day clock altogether.

The

Byrd proposal would have removed the time limit and
substituted an expedited procedure for considering
legislation introduced by the Permanent Consultative Group.
Opponents of the Resolution support eliminating section 5
because requiring troops be removed once they are deployed
undermines presidential foreign policy. 236

Professor

Trimble adds that the provision precipitates a congressional
debate before the issues are clarified.

He suggests instead

an expedited procedure for considering the military
situation 9 to 12 months after it is initiated.237

234
Ely,
"Suppose Congress
Resolution that Worked," p. 1399.
235
Ibid., pp.
Diplomacy, pp. 119-120.
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Glennon,

a

War

Powers

Constitutional

236 Patrick D. Robbins, "The War Powers Resolution after
Fifteen Years:
A Reassessment," American University Law
Review 38 (Fall 1988), p. 143.
237
Abraham Sofaer and Geoffrey Miller fault section
5 because it allows Congress to require troop withdrawals by
doing nothing.
(Sofaer, p. 324).
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E.

SECTION 5(C)

There is perhaps the most consensus among WPR authors
on the need to modify section 5(c) which provides that
Congress can require the president to remove troops by
concurrent resolution not subject to the president's veto.
Most commentators on the WPR, including Representative
Hamilton, Patrick Robbins, and Glennon, concede that this
section is probably unconstitutional because it constitutes
the type of legislative veto struck down by the Supreme
Court's decision in I.N.S. v. Chadha.238

In Chadha. the

Court ruled that where Congress delegates authority to the
executive it cannot legislatively veto executive action by
concurrent resolution but must present a resolution to the
president subject to his veto.
Ely, Steele, and Senator Javits, however, maintain a
plausible argument could be made that section 5 (c) is
constitutional and can be distinguished from Chadha.

They

argue Congress did not delegate the authority to the
president in the WPR to deploy troops and thus the Chadha
presentment and bicameralism requirements do not apply.239
230

103 S.Ct. 2764 (1983) .

239 Ely, "Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that
Worked," pp. 13 95-96.
Ely and Firmage add that section 5 (b) should be
augmented to state if the President fails to terminate the use
of military force, funds to support the troops will be
immediately terminated. As Congress may be reluctant to take
responsibility and affirmatively deny appropriations, this
should bolster Congress' ability to restrict presidential
military activity.
(Ibid., p. 1401).
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Bills proposing that the WPR be repealed or revised
have been introduced in Congress every year since 1973.
Although some have been seriously considered, none have
passed.

On October 22, 1993, Senate Democrats announced

plans to rework the Resolution.

Similar legislation has

been introduced in the House. 240

considering the history

of congressional inertia on the issue, it is not surprising
that both resolutions died in committee.

The new Republican

majority elected in 1994 has not announced its position on
war powers reforms.
V.

CONCLUSION

The WPR is as controversial today as it was when it was
first enacted.

The geographical focus of the debate has

simply shifted from Vietnam to the Persian Gulf to Haiti.
Although opponents of the WPR articulately present their
arguments, the Resolution is well supported by
constitutional and political considerations.

The text of

the Constitution and the Framer's intent indicates that
Congress is granted plenary powers over war.

The WPR merely

attempts, albeit imperfectly, to redefine that authority.
As a practical matter, if Congress has the authority to
determine when America will go to war it should have the
commensurate power to pass legislation that explains and
procedurally facilitates this power.
240
Doherty, "On Somalia, War Powers Law Becomes a GOP
Weapon," p. 2987.
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Constitutional considerations aside, the WPR also
serves several significant political purposes.

The

democratic process is protected by separating power,
encouraging debate, and requiring consensus.

The Framers

wanted it to be difficult for the U.S. to get into war
because they recognized that hostilities are rarely
beneficial in the long-run.

Although a binding WPR will

admittedly preempt some presidential military successes, it
will also prevent presidential debacles such as Vietnam and
the Marine deployment in Lebanon.
The Resolution's political benefits, however, cannot be
fully realized until its weaknesses are rectified by
amendment.

The Resolution's gravest functional problem is

that it allows the president to initially deploy troops for
60 days without congressional authorization.

As a practical

matter, once troops are committed it becomes politically
difficult for Congress to require their return.

The

original Senate language should be retrieved which would
require the president to seek congressional approval prior
to deploying troops in hostile situations except in clearly
defined emergencies.
As consulting with the entire Congress is unwieldy and
impractical, a consultative group of congressional
leadership should be established with whom the president
must consult on offensive military operations and covert
activity.

The term "hostilities" must be clearly and
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unambiguously defined (if such a thing is possible), to
replace arguments of semantics with arguments of substance.
Although the concurrent resolution provision may be
constitutional, it is so controversial it should be
eliminated.

Finally, to promote presidential compliance and

judicial review, the WPR should contain language restricting
military appropriations and providing a majority of Congress
with judicial standing to file suit if the president refuses
to comply with the Resolution's requirements.
Although these modifications will not guarantee
presidential compliance with the WPR, they will encourage
it.

Ultimately, however, Congress' ability to reassert its

constitutional war power depends much more on congressional
will than on the WPR, no matter how artfully drafted.
History has shown without that will, no constitutional, and
certainly no legislative, safeguard is sufficient.

CHAPTER 4
UNITED NATIONS AUTHORIZATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

In addition to claiming constitutional authority to
conduct military activity in the Persian Gulf, President
Bush argued that United Nations' resolutions granted him the
power to take offensive action.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait on

August 2, 1990, the Security Council immediately passed
Resolution 660 which declared that a breach of the peace had
occurred and demanded Iraq withdraw.241

Several other

resolutions followed imposing economic and diplomatic
sanctions against Iraq.

Resolution 678 was passed by the

Security Council on November 29, 1990.

It authorized member

states to use "all necessary means" to implement previous
U.N. resolutions demanding an Iraqi withdrawal from
Kuwait. 242

President Bush subsequently asserted he had

241
Peter R. Baehr and Leon Gordenker.
The United
Nations in the 1990s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p.
73 .
242
The pertinent provisions of Resolution 678 are:
1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution
660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and
decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to
allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of
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authority under international law to implement Resolution
678 without further authorization from Congress.243
In order to obtain international support for the use of
force, Secretary of State Baker began extensive
international negotiations in early November.

He visited

the countries of the Security Council and the anti-Iraq
coalition.

Several authors argue that President Bush's

primary rationale in seeking Resolution 678 was to present
Congress with a diplomatic fait accompli that would force
them to approve his military actions in the Gulf.244
Although it would be cynical to state that the President's
foremost motive in seeking the Resolution was to circumvent
Congress, evidence indicates that it was certainly a
consideration.

goodwill, to do so;
2. Authorizes Member States
co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless
Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements,
as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing
resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold
and implement resolution 660 and all subsequent
relevant resolutions and to restore international
peace and security in the area;
3. Requests all
States to provide appropriate support for the
actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of
the present resolution;. . . (quoted by Michael J.
Glennon, "The Constitution and Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter," The American Journal of
International Law 85 (January 1991) , pp. 74-75) .
243
After assisting in the negotiationswith the
Security Council to pass Resolution 678, Undersecretary of
State Bob Kimmit stated: "We feel like now we have a strong
basis in international law for the use of force." (quoted in
Triumph Without Victory, p. 182).
Ibid., pp. 175-78; Smith, p. 207.
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Ironically, Congress convened hearings on President
Bush's actions in the Gulf two days before Resolution 678
was passed.

The administration failed to send its top

witnesses to the congressional hearings for fear of
upsetting delicate U.N. negotiations over the Resolution.
In effect, President Bush indicated that the U.N.
discussions took precedence over congressional
discussions.245
On January 3, President Bush sent a letter to Congress
requesting congressional approval for the war.

He requested

a resolution authorizing him to use "all necessary means" to
eject Iraq from Kuwait.

By deliberately using the language

from Resolution 678, Congress was being asked only to
authorize the President to enforce a resolution already
adopted by the Security Council.

Thus, Bush's aides noted,

he could obtain congressional acquiescence while
sidestepping the constitutional issue.246
Not surprisingly, supporters of President Bush used
Resolution 678 as a primary rationale for endorsing the
President's actions in the Gulf.

The comments of Paul Henry

(R.Mich.) during the congressional debate over the Gulf
crisis in January were representative of many in Congress:

245
John F. Lehman, Making War
Scribner's Sons, 1992), p. 39.

(New York:

Triumph Without Victory, pp. 202-203

Charles
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The U.S. Congress ought not to put itself at odds
against the United Nations or question the
considered opinion and actions of the Security
Council. Turning against the United Nations in
this instance would strike a blow against the
struggle to refine and strengthen international
peacekeeping institutions that will be so
important in the post-cold war era.247
A joint congressional resolution authorizing the use of
force was passed on January 12, 1991.

It referred to the

United Nations five times and U.N. Resolution 678 twice.248
Clearly, the existence of Resolution 678 increased the
likelihood Congress would authorize the Persian Gulf
War. 249

It also increased the likelihood that President

Bush would have gone to war without Congress. After the war
the President commented:
Though I felt after studying the question that I had
the inherent power to commit our forces to battle after
the United Nations Resolution, I solicited
congressional support before committing our forces to
the Gulf War.250
President Bush had discovered a new source of
legitimacy for executive war-making:

multilateral

commitments under the auspices of the U.N.251 Whether
Security Council authorization to use force can be
247
Robert W. Gregg, About Face? The United States and
the United Nations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1993), p. 117.
248

Ibid., p. 117.

249

Ibid.

250
President Bush's speech at Princeton University on
May 10, 1991, quoted by Pfiffner, p. 11.
The Gulf War Reader, p. 192.
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substituted for a congressional declaration of war, however,
is a question that can be answered by the text of the U.N.
Charter and enabling legislation, the opinions of legal
scholars, the history of U.N. military activity, and the
text of Resolution 678 itself.
II.

THE U.N. CHARTER

Section 7 of the U.N. Charter discusses the use of
military force.

Article 39 provides that the Security

Council will determine when a breach of the peace occurs and
will make recommendations to restore peace. 252

The only

section relating to the use of force, Article 42, provides
that the Security Council is authorized to "take such action
by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security," including
"demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea,
or land forces of Members of the United Nations."253
252
The entire text of Article 39 is as follows:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendation, or decide what
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
253
The entire text of Article 42 states:
Should the Security Council consider that measures
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or
have proved to be inadequate, it may take such
action by air, sea or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
Such action may include
demonstrations, blockage, and other operations by
air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United
Nations.
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Military personnel and equipment to be used for such
U.N. operations are provided for only in Article 43.

It

requires member states to "undertake to make available to
the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a
special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance,
and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for
the purpose of maintaining international peace and
security."

Article 43 adds that the armed forces to be

utilized by the Security Council will be provided by member
states pursuant to special agreements to be negotiated "in
accordance with the respective constitutional processes" of
each member state.254
Although Article 42 does provide that the Security
Council can take military action, the equipment and troops
necessary for such action are wholly dependent upon the
254
The entire text of Article 43 states:
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to
contribute to the maintenance of international
peace and security, undertake to make available to
the Security Council, on its call and in accordance
with a special agreement or agreements, armed
forces, assistance and facilities, including rights
of
passage,
necessary
for
the
purpose
of
maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the
numbers and types of forces, their degree of
readiness and general location, and the nature of
the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3 . The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated
as soon as possible on the initiative of the
Security Council. They shall be concluded between
the Security Council and Members or between the
Security Council and groups of Members and shall be
subject to ratification by the signatory states in
accordance with their respective constitutional
processes.
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adoption of specific agreements.

Article 43 explicitly

requires these agreements be adopted pursuant to the
"constitutional processes" of each member.

This language

preserves Congress' constitutional role in any decision to
commit U.S. troops to war--whether that war is
internationally sanctioned or not.

No such agreement has

ever been ratified by the U.S. or any other nation.

A

treatise on the Charter of the U.N. explains:
Article 42 by itself does not specify the source
of the "air, sea, or land forces" for implementing
military enforcement measures. The drafters of
the Charter clearly expected that the forces would
be made available to the Security Council in
accordance with the "special agreements" to be
concluded under Article 43. The link between the
two articles is specifically indicated in Article
106, which envisages possible joint action by the
permanent members pending the coming into force of
such special agreements referred to in Article 43
255

The plain text of Articles 42 and 43 indicates that the
Security Council cannot obligate or authorize a member state
to deploy troops unless that nation has signed a special
agreement to do so. 256 As the United States has never
adopted such an agreement, the Security Council could not
substitute for Congress in authorizing President Bush to

255
Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Hambro and Anne Patricia
Simmons, Charter of the United Nations. 3rd ed. (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 316.
256

Berger, p. 93.
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take offensive action in the Persian Gulf. 257

Because no

special agreements had been adopted, in the case of Kuwait
the Security Council requested the use of ad hoc forces to
restore peace. 258 Although the Security Council can
request such action be taken, nothing in the U.N. Charter
requires the U.S. to comply or provides the president with
any additional authority.
The background of the U.N. Charter supports this
interpretation.

The U.N. Charter was initially drafted at a

meeting attended by the U.S., the Soviet Union, and Britain
in Dumbarton Oaks.

Prior to that meeting in April 1944,

Secretary of State Cordell Hull met with a select senatorial
committee to discuss drafts of the U.N. plan.

President

Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted to involve the Senators early
in the process to avoid the embarrassing defeat Woodrow
257
The executive branch also cited Article 51 as
authorization for President Bush's military activity. Article
51 states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has
taken
measures
necessary
to
maintain
international peace and security. . .
This contention is not supported by the text of Article 51.
This provision merely recognizes the right of collective selfdefense, it does not authorize such action.
Nothing in
article 51 supercedes the constitutional requirement of a
congressional declaration of war.
Moreover, U.N. lawyers
argued that the article prohibits unilateral action by one
country in support of another once the Security Council has
taken measures to restore international peace.
(Hiro, pp.
131-32) .
258
Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin, "The U.N. in
a New World Order," Foreign Affairs 70 (Spring 1991), p. 73.
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Wilson experienced with the League of Nations.

Hull assured

the Senators that any agreement to supply troops for U.N.
missions would be submitted to them in advance for
approval.259
In August 1944, however, State Department Legal Advisor
Green Hackworth prepared and circulated a memo arguing that
once the Senate approved the U.N. Charter the president
would have the authority to commit troops to U.N.
peacekeeping operations. 260

To alleviate congressional

criticism of this position, Edward Stettinius, the head of
the American delegation to Dumbarton Oaks, included the
reservation in Article 43 that each special agreement would
be subject to ratification in accordance with the member
states' constitutional processes.261
The official U.N. Charter was drafted at the San
Francisco Conference in 1945.

When Article 43 was

discussed, it was agreed that members would not have to
furnish military assistance in excess of any special
agreement.

A treatise on the U.N. concludes:

"This leads

to the inference that a member is under no obligation to
take military action under Article 42 until it has concluded

259 Robert C. Hilderbrand, Dumbarton Oaks (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1990), p. 57.
260

Ibid., p. 150.

261

Ibid., p. 156.
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a special agreement under Article 43. 1,252 When discussing
the creation of a United Nations Guard in 1948, SecretaryGeneral Trygve Lie similarly stated that action under
Article 42 could only be taken in accordance with a special
agreement under Article 43.263
In the absence of a special agreement, then, the
president must either go to Congress for a declaration or
use his inherent, yet limited, constitutional authority to
"repel sudden attacks."264
A.

SENATE RATIFICATION

Article 43 became crucial during the ratification
debates in the Senate.

Senator Arthur Vandenberg, one of

the delegates to the U.N. conference in San Francisco which
adopted the final version of the U.N. Charter, emphasized to
the Senate that the Charter preserved American
"constitutional processes."265 He did acknowledge,
however, that the president could use preliminary force in
small-scale police actions which did not amount to war.266
In speeches favoring ratification, Senators Burton Wheeler,
Barkley, and White stated that the special agreements
262

Goodrich, Hambro and Simmons, p. 316.

263 Quoted in Glennon, "The Constitution and Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter," p. 77.
264

Stromseth, p. 92.

265

91 Congressional Record 7957 (1945) .

266

Ibid., p. 7992.
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detailing military commitments to the U.N. would return to
the Senate for confirmation. 267

Senator Wheeler added that

at the time the agreements were presented the Senate could
determine their policy regarding sending troops to foreign
countries.268
The debate indicates that the overwhelming majority of
Senators believed Congress would play its constitutional
role in determining U.S. military commitments to the U.N.
The major controversy in the Senate concerned only whether
the special agreements were to be ratified by 2/3's of the
Senate as treaties were or whether they would be ratified by
joint legislation of both Houses.
Another delegate to the San Francisco conference,
Senator Connelly, interpreted the "constitutional processes"
by which the special agreements would be adopted to be
Senate ratification. 269 Senator Hill argued, on the other
hand, that the amount of military forces to be supplied
should be decided by both houses of Congress.270
During the Senate discussionover

howtroops

provided to the U.N., San Franciscodelegate

would be

John Foster

Dulles testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee was reviewed and emphasized.

When asked if the

267

Ibid., p. 7970-71; 7987; 7993.

268

Ibid., p. 7987.

269

Ibid., p. 7987.

270

Ibid., p. 7988.
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Senate would have a chance to ratify the special agreements,
Dulles had stated, "it is not only my opinion, but it is
expressly stated in the charter that the agreements are
subject to ratification by the states in accordance with
their constitutional processes."271 According to Dulles,
constitutional processes signified treaty ratification by
2/3's of the Senate.
Dulles continued that it was the view of the entire
American delegation to San Francisco that the agreements
would consist of a supplemental treaty rather than an
executive agreement. 272

Senator Vandenburg concurred that

furnishing troops to the U.N. under the Charter could not be
done by executive agreement. 273

Senator Wheeler similarly

stated that the American people would never support the U.N.
treaty if it meant the president could send troops anywhere
and take power away from Congress. 274

It was understood by

the Senate that if the president wanted to deploy more
troops to the U.N. than specified in the special agreement,
Congress would have to separately authorize it.275
Legal scholar John Hart Ely concludes that the argument
that authorization from the Security Council replaces
271
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Stromseth, p. 86.
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authorization from Congress not only violates the specific
grounds on which Congress accepted membership, it also
violates the Constitution. 276

Edward Corwin adds that a

treaty cannot be read to augment the war power of the
president. 277 Other commentators suggest that even if the
Senate had intended to delegate its warmaking role to the
president under the U.N. Charter, it could not do so alone
by treaty. 278

The House of Representatives must concur in

any decision to go to war and it would be unconstitutional
for any treaty to purport to divest them of this right.279
B.

THE UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION ACT

Any remaining questions regarding the appropriate
method of providing troops for U.N. operations were answered
when Congress passed the United Nations Participation Act
(UNPA) in December 1945.

The UNPA, which outlined the terms

of American participation in the U.N., specifically states:

276
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277
Edward S. Corwin, Total War and the Constitution
(Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), p. 152.
278
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279 Glennon, "The Constitution and Chapter VII of the
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The President is authorized to negotiate a special
agreement or agreements with the Security Council
which shall be subject to the approval of the
Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution,
providing for the numbers and types of armed
forces, their degree of readiness and the nature
of facilities and assistance, including rights of
passage, to be made available to the Security
Council on its call for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security in accordance
with article 43 of said Charter. . . . Provided,
That nothing herein contained shall be construed
as an authorization to the President by the
Congress to make available to the Security Council
for such purpose armed forces, facilities, or
assistance in addition to the forces, facilities,
and assistance provided for in such special
agreement or agreements.280
The legislative debate over the UNPA was strikingly similar
to the Senate discussion regarding the U.N. Charter.

After

reiterating that the legislators' powers were protected by
the requirement that Congress pass upon any special
agreement before military assistance would be provided to
the U.N., Representative Bloom (N.Y.) concluded:

"the

traditional relationship between the executive and
legislative branches of our government is fully
preserved."281

Representative Jarman (Ala.) added in

response to the question of whether issues of war would come
back to Congress:

"In no respect does Congress divest

itself of the right to declare war or not to declare
war. "282

These comments, and the statements of senators

Quoted by Corwin, p. 221
91 Cong. Rec. 12267 (1945) .
Ibid., p . 12288.
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during the U.N. Charter debates, are representative of the
majority of legislators who believed that their
constitutional role in initiating war would be preserved
under the U.N. system.

Although there were several

legislators who worried that adopting the Charter and UNPA
would confer war-making power on the president, they were a
small minority.283
Just as both Houses of Congress must concur in the
critical decision over going to war, both Houses must
determine whether U.S. troops will be made available to the
U.N. for military enforcement actions.

The text of the UNPA

and reports from the House and Senate underscored the fact
that neither the Act nor the Charter conferred any authority
on the president to provide troops to the Security Council
under anything but an Article 43 agreement ratified by
Congress. 284

Professor Corwin concludes that, "the

controlling theory of the act is that American participation

283 The House vote on the UNPA was 344 Yeas, 15 Nays, 72
Not Voting, and 1 Voting Present.
(91 Cong. Rec. 122 88
(1945)) .
284
The reports stated in part:
At the same time it was considered important to
make it clear that nothing contained in the statue
should be construed as an authorization to the
President by the Congress to make available to the
Security Council for such purpose, armed forces in
addition to such as may be provided for in the
military (special) agreements.
(Glennon, "The
Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter," p. 79, italics supplied).
Amendments to the UNPA do provide that the President
can deploy up to 1000 troops as peacekeepers.
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in the United Nations shall rest on the principle of
departmental collaboration, and not on an exclusive
presidential prerogative in the diplomatic field."285
Professor Louis Fisher concurs:

"Pursuant to this statute,

the President can commit armed forces to the United Nations
only after Congress grants its approval."286
Ill.

KOREA

Although the U.N. has existed since 1945, the Security
Council has only authorized the use of force to restore
peace twice--in Korea and Kuwait.

When North Korea attacked

South Korea on June 25, 1950, the Security Council
immediately passed a resolution which determined that a
breach of the peace had occurred and called on North Korea
to cease hostilities and withdraw.

When North Korea failed

to respond, the Security Council "called on" its members to
implement the resolution.
On June 27, 1950, President Harry Truman ordered troops
to Korea without consulting Congress.

In his statement

announcing the deployment, he quoted from the Security
Council's resolution demanding North Korea withdraw.287
Truman's Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated:

"All

action taken by the United States to restore peace in Korea

285
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286
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287
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has been under the aegis of the United Nations." 288

It

should be noted, however, that the Security Council did not
pass a specific resolution recommending members furnish
military assistance until the day after President Truman
committed U.S. troops.
In his memoirs, Dean Acheson explains that President
Truman did meet with congressional leaders to brief them
about the situation in Korea on June 27th and June 30th.

At

the second meeting, Senator H. Alexander Smith suggested
that a joint resolution be introduced supporting the
President's actions.

President Truman referred the matter

to Acheson for a recommendation.

On July 3, Acheson

recommended that the President rely on his power as
commander-in-chief and as president rather than requesting
congressional authorization.

The State Department then

prepared a bulletin outling 87 instances in which
president's had responded militarily on their own
initiative.289
288

Fisher, "The Power of Commander in Chief," p. 55.

289 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York:
W.W. Norton & Co., 1969), pp. 413-14.
In a recently published article in the National Security
Law Report. legal scholar Robert Turner challenges the
conventional wisdom that Truman ignored Congress.
Turner
discusses several recently declassefied documents which
indicate that Truman immediately met with congressional
leaders after the North Korean invasion to discuss deploying
troops.
According to these documents, it was Truman who
suggested introducing a joint resolution supporting his
actions but was told by several members of congress that it
was not necessary. Turner concludes that Truman attempted to
keep Congress informed and left it to Congress to determine
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Although some in Congress decried this unilateral use
of presidential military power, Cold War considerations led
the majority to pass legislation facilitating the Korean
War.

In discussing Korea later, however, legal scholar

Charles Lofgren summarized the feelings of many legislators
and scholars:

"Quite clearly the resolutions of the

Security Council provided no substitute for a declaration of
war in terms of domestic constitutional law. "290
If Korea did provide a precedent for Kuwait, it is
certainly an anomalous one.

In the U.N.'s 50 year history,

Korea and Kuwait are the only instances of U.N. sanctioned
large-scale military action.

One anomalous war cannot serve

as the basis for reinterpreting America's treaty obligations

whether additional authorization was necessary.
(Robert F.
Turner, "Truman Didn't Ignore Congress," National Security Law
Report 16 (September 1994), pp. 1-6).
Although these new documents shed additional light on the
events surrounding the Korean War, they do not alter the
relevance of comparisons between the Gulf War and Korean War.
The Korean War remains pivotal in any examination of the
expansion of presidential war powers. Like the Persian Gulf
War, President Truman relied on U.N. authorization and his
power as commander-in-chief to defend his military actions.
President Truman and Bush both then left it to Congress to
challenge their actions.
290
Ibid., p. 211. Law professors Ann Van Wynen Thomas
and A.J. Thomas disagree.
They argue that where the use of
force is recommended such as Korea, the president has the
power to employ force short of legal war to enforce the U.N.
Charter's treaty provisions.
This argument, however, seems
ridiculous on its face.
Even if the president does posess
constitutional authority to deploy small numbers of troops in
situations short of war, the magnitude of the American
military involvement in Korea indicates that it was clearly
not such a case.
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to the U.N., nor can it provide sufficient precedent to
redefine the constitutional allocation of war powers.
IV. THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

The contention that the Security

Council

could not

authorize President Bush to go to war is also supported by
the text of the War Powers Resolution

(WPR).

The WPR

expressly states that authority for the president to
introduce armed forces into hostilities cannot be inferred
from any treaty or any statute.291 Although section
8 (d)(1) of the WPR does state that nothing in the statute
should alter the terms of existing treaties, Glennon quotes
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report which states:
"Thus, by requiring statutory action,

. . . the War Powers

Resolution would perform the important function of defining
that elusive and controversial phrase-constitutional
291

Section 8(a) provides:
Authority
to introduce United StatesArmed
Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by
the circumstances shall not be inferred-1) from
any provision of law (whether or not
in effect before the date of the enactment of this
joint
resolution),
including
any
provision
contained in a appropriation Act, unless such
provision specifically authorizes the introduction
of United States Armed Forces into hostilities . .
2)
from any treaty heretofore or hereafter
ratified unless such treaty is implemented by
legislationspecifically
authorizing
the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into
hostilities or into such situations and stating
that
it is
intended to constitute
specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of this
joint resolution.
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processes'--which is contained in our security
treaties."292

In other words, the WPR does not attempt to

alter the U.N. Charter, it just explains that the Charter
has always been interpreted by Congress as preserving its
constitutional role in decisions over war.
Assuming arguendo that the Charter had conferred
additional warmaking authority on the president, the WPR
then would nullify it.

The "last in time doctrine" holds

that the latest congressional pronouncement on a given issue
will govern. 293

Professor Edwin Firmage states:

"The War

Powers Resolution, as an act of Congress subsequent to the
formation of the United Nations, precludes United Nations
authorization of United States military action absent
congressional approval."294

Congress clearly intended the

WPR to reiterate the necessity of congressional
authorization prior to military action such as the Persian
Gulf War.295
292
Glennon, "The Constitution and Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter," p. 83.
293 This position is
Citizens in Nicaragua v.
1988), which held that
subordinate to subsequent

also supported by Committee of U.S.
Reagan. 859 F.2d 929, 937 (D.D.C.
a treaty obligation is legally
congressional authorization.

294
Edwin B. Firmage and Joseph E. Wrona, p. 1708.
Professor James Nathan concurs that the WPR excludes any
inference of authority for presidential war-making, "including
the U.N."
(Nathan, "Curbing the Distress of War," p. 608).
295 Thomas Franck disagrees with this interpretation of
the WPR. He argues that provision 8(d)(1) which states that
nothing in the Resolution is "intended to alter . . . the
provisions of existing treaties" is internally inconsistent
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V.

AUTHORIZATION OR OBLIGATION

Even if the U.N. Charter or UNPA granted the president
the right to provide troops to enforce U.N. resolutions,
Resolution 678 only "authorized" the U.S. to use "all
necessary means;" it did not require it. 296

Resolution 678

states in pertinent part:
AUTHORIZES member states cooperating with the
Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before
Jan. 15, 1991, fully implements, as set forth in
paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to
use all necessary means to uphold and implement
the Security Council Resolution 660 and all
subsequent relevant Resolutions and to restore
international peace and security in the area . . .
Glennon emphasizes that there is a significant legal
distinction between obligatory and permissive Security
Council decisions concerning the use of force. 297 Glennon
concludes that a permissive Security Council decision such
as Resolution 678 has no effect on the domestic
constitutional allocation of power;

"that a right exists

under international law to take certain action says nothing
about whether a power exists under domestic law to exercise

with section 8 (a) which negates any inference of presidential
authority. Franck contends that because the WPR is ambiguous,
the U.S. is still required to fulfill its obligations under
the U.N. charter.
(Thomas M. Franck and Faiza Patel, "UN
Police Action in Lieu of War:
The Old Order Changeth, "
American Journal of International Law 85 (January 1991), pp.
72-73) .
296

Stromseth, p. 92.

297

Glennon, p. 75.
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that right." 298

Thus, the resolution "imposed no treaty

obligation at all."299

Fisher similarly asserts that U.S.

actions after the resolution were permissive and subject to
America's constitutional processes. 300 Secretary of State
James Baker seemed to acknowledge this when he conceded that
Resolution 678 merely authorized the use of force, it did
not obligate it.301
Moreover, the Resolution did not require member states
to use military force--only "all necessary means."

Berger

argues: "The option of war in support of Resolution 678 was
a 'discretionary national decision,' subject to the
constitutional processes of each member nation. 1,302
President Bush's decision to implement the Resolution with
troops was wholly his own.
298

Ibid., p. 81.

299

Raven-Hansen, p. 10.

300

Fisher, p. 57.

301

Glennon, "The Gulf War and the Constitution," p. 90.

302
Berger, p. 89.
International legal scholar Jorge
Castaneda concludes that although the Security Council can
create a military force when breaches of the peace occur
without complying with the procedures in Chapter 7, they may
recommend but not require troops to establish it.
(Jorge
Castaneda, Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions, trans.
Alba Amoia, eds. Leland M. Goodrich and William T.R. Fox, no.
6 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 108.
In fact, Baker drafted the resolution deliberately using
the words "all necessary means" to appease the Russians who
did not want the use of military force to be specified in the
resolution.
(Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsch, The Gulf
Conflict: 1990-1991 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1993), p. 229) .
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VI.

CONCLUSION

As U.N. sponsored military enforcement action becomes
more prevalent, it is important to clarify the appropriate
avenue of U.S. participation.

Since the Gulf War, the U.N.

has authorized peace enforcement measures in Somalia,
Bosnia, and Haiti.

In fact, U.N. Ambassador Madeleine

Albright recently concluded:

"At this stage in world

history practically every foreign-policy issue has something
to do with the U.N." 303

With the ending of the Cold War

deadlock in the Security Council, the U.N. now possesses the
unique ability to marshall international consensus to
promote collective security.

The U.S. should play a

significant role in this "new world order."304
It must be remembered, however, that the Constitution
prescribes a role for Congress before U.S. troops are
committed to a massive offensive such as the one launched in
Kuwait.

The U.N. Charter did not, and could not, change the

constitutional allocation of war powers.

International

support cannot serve as a substitute for domestic support.
As a member of the U.N., the president is not empowered to
deploy more troops than his constitutional designation as
commander-in-chief allows.

Unfortunately, this conclusion

303
Kevin Fedarko, "Clinton's Blunt Instrument," Time
(October 31, 1994), p. 31.
304 President Bush's speech to Congress on September 15,
1990, quoted in Freedman and Karsch, p. 215.
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leads back to the endlessly debated larger discussion over
the appropriate constitutional division of war powers.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

The events surrounding the Persian Gulf War emphasized,
and perhaps widened, the gulf between Congress and the
president over the appropriate exercise of constitutional
war powers.

Although legal scholars utilize original intent

arguments to justify vastly different positions on
presidential war powers, the Framers' statements indicate
several things.
First, based on their experience with the English king,
they feared the executive branch would be most prone to war
and thus could not be trusted with the power to embroil the
nation in hostilities.

The number of American unilateral

presidential military committments abroad seem to prove
their fears were not unfounded. Second, the Framers wanted
it to be difficult for the nation to go to war, so they
favored giving this power to Congress to promote
deliberation and debate.

They believed Congress could more

appropriately determine what military involvments would be
in the national interest and considered delay a benefit not
a detriment.

Third, the Framers intended congressional

authority over war to be a significant power and a necessary
111
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curb on the executive.

Given the weight the Framers gave to

Congress' war power, it seems disengenuous to argue that the
Framers intended the declaration clause to be obsolete or to
apply to such a miniscule number of cases that it would be
practically irrelevant.
Moreover, the Framers lived in a dangerous time.

They

had experienced war and understood the threats that faced
the nation.

Although the world situation has changed over

200 years, the implications of military involvment have not.
The provisions for war the Framers drafted are equally
applicable today.

Finally, the constitutional safeguards

found in the separation of war powers are more vital to
America's security than the ability of any president to
intervene at will in international crises.
Constitutional considerations aside, there are more
political benefits to vesting war powers in Congress than
there are costs.

Certainly Congress cannot act a rapidly as

the president, however, history indicates that hasty
military committments often have unintended negative
repurcussions and may provide little long-term benefit.
few modern examples illustrate this point. 305

A

Presidential

action was responsible for arguably America's largest
military and foreign policy disaster:

the war in Vietnam.

President Nixon then bombed Laos and invaded Cambodia.
305
It should be noted that I am not asserting that
Congress' foreign policy and military record has been free
from blemishes.
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President Reagan committed American marines to a disastrous
attempt to stop the civil war in Lebanon.

President Bush

invaded Panama to depose President Noriega, a former
American friend.

Bush and Prsident Clinton also committed

American troops to Somalia who came under fire and were
later withdrawn with little appreciable benefit.
There are countless international situations that do
not threaten American national interests.

American prestige

abroad is as damaged by ill-conceived military policy, as it
is by a president whose power is checked by Congress.
Although restrictions on presidential authority over war may
contribute to less efficient government, they are part of
and protect the democratic process.
The WPR can potentially facilitate such a legislative
safeguard.

If amended to eliminate several vague

provisions, the WPR can provide a blueprint for both the
president and Congress in future military entanglements.
The Resolution can specify a group of congressional leaders
with whom the president can consult to provide a ready forum
for executive-legislative discussions.

If the reporting

loophole is eliminated, the president will be required to
report to Congress who will then have to vote on large-scale
military committments and will be required to make the
difficult decisions it has often evaded.

Certainly, no war

powers legislation can completely address every situation.
However, an amended resolution will encourage presidential
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compliance and will signal Congress' determination to play a
larger role in war powers issues.
Congress will certainly need to protect its war-making
prerogatives as the U.S. becomes increasingly involved in
U.N. engagements. The U.N. can
effective

tool for

the U.S.

interests

abroad. However, the

authorize

the U.S.

be, and has been, an
to protect its national
U.N. Security Council cannot

president togo to war.

Asserting that

U.N. membership changes the separation of war powers
contravenes the text of the Charter, the intent of the
senators who ratified the document, and the Constitution.
Articles 42 and 43 specify that U.S. troops would be
provided to the U.N. only by separate agreements ratified by
Congress.

The senators adopted the Charter based upon their

belief that these provisions protected their constitutional
power to determine when American troops would be deployed.
An international consensus for war cannot, and should not,
serve as a substitute for a domestic consensus for war.
The constitution's separated and shared war powers are
an "invitation to struggle."

That appears to be the point.

The Framers were more concerned with the debate itself than
the outcome.

As the executive branch has increasingly

utilyzed the military abroad and the legislative branch has
largely remained silent, democracy has suffered because the
debate has become less vigorous. The struggle over war
powers should not just be fought by academics.
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Notwithstanding the differences among legal scholars
and the executive and legislative branches over the extent
of presidential authority, the Persian Gulf War should be an
easy case.

Here nearly 500,000 American troops were

deployed into an extremely hostile situation.
offensive,

They began an

sustained casualties, killed an estimated

100,000 Iraqi soldiers, 306 and drove the Iraqi army from
Kuwait.

This scenario constituted war under any definition

of the term.

If, as President Bush and others contended,

Congress had no role here, it will never have a role in
committing the nation to war.
prerogatives.

Only Congress can protect its

If Congress continues to let the president

exercise such unilateral control over American military
engagements, then the Constitution did not prevail during
the Persian Gulf War, it became the first casualty.

Pfiffner, p. 18.
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